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Stark racial disparities define America’s relationship with the 
death penalty. Though commentators have scrutinized a range of 
possible causes for this uneven racial distribution of death 
sentences, no convincing evidence suggests that any one of these 
factors consistently account for the unjustified racial disparities at 
play in the administration of capital punishment. We propose that 
a unifying current running through each of these partial plausible 
explanations is the notion that the human mind may unwittingly 
contribute bias into the seemingly neutral concepts and processes 
of death penalty administration.  
 
To test the effects of implicit bias on the death penalty, we 
conducted a study on 445 jury eligible citizens in six leading death 
penalty states. We found that jury eligible citizens harbored the 
two different kinds of implicit racial bias we tested:  implicit racial 
stereotypes about Blacks and Whites generally, as well as implicit 
associations between race and the value of life. We also found that 
death qualified jurors, those that expressed a willingness to 
consider imposing both a life sentence and a death sentence, 
harbored stronger implicit and self-reported (explicit) racial 
biases than excluded jurors. The results of the study underscore 
the potentially powerful role of implicit bias and suggest that 
racial disparities in the modern death penalty could be linked to 
the very concepts entrusted to maintain the continued 
constitutionality of capital punishment: its retributive core, its 
empowerment of juries to express the cultural consensus of local 
communities, and the modern regulatory measures that promised 
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Stark racial disparities define America’s relationship with the death penalty.
1
 
Scholars began documenting these disparities over a hundred years ago,
2
 and 
modern empirical evidence demonstrates their continued existence.
3
 The most 
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1
 See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE:  RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) [hereinafter FROM LYNCH MOBS]; 
STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY:  AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002); RANDALL KENNEDY, 
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997).  See also Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death 
Penalty Trials:  Biographical Racism, Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2004) (stating that “between 1930 and 1982, African Americans 
constituted between 10% and 12% of the United States population but 53% of those executed”) 
(citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Capital Punishment 1982, Aug. 1984, at 
9). 
2
 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Black Man’s Burden:  Race and the Death Penalty in America, 81 OR. L. 
REV. 15, 18 (2002) (noting that “the racially disproportionate application of the death penalty can 
be seen as being in historical continuity with the long and sordid history of lynching in this 
country”). 
3
 See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990) 
[hereinafter BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE]; SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND 
DISCRIMINATION:  RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989).  See also David C. Baldus 
& George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment:  
Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411 (2004) 
[hereinafter Baldus & Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Legitimacy of Capital 
Punishment];  David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration 
of the Death Penalty:  An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post-
1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194 (2003) [hereinafter Baldus & Woodworth, Race 
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty]; Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, 
Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials:  1976–1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 1 
(1995); U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Death Penalty Sentencing:  Research Indicates Pattern of 
Racial Disparities (GAO/GGD- 90-57, 1990). 
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consistent and robust finding in this literature is that even after controlling for 
dozens and sometimes hundreds of case-related variables, Americans who murder 
Whites are more likely to receive a death sentence than those who murder 
Blacks.
4
 Though the effects are smaller (and more controversial), a significant 
body of research also finds that, in some jurisdictions, Black defendants are 
sentenced to death more frequently than White defendants, especially when the 




Commentators have scrutinized a range of possible causes for this uneven racial 
distribution of death sentences. These possible explanations fit into three broad 
categories: 1) spatial and cultural (for example, prosecutors might be more 
inclined to pursue capital charges when a non-White community outsider crosses 
geographic and social boundaries to commit a crime against a White community 
insider;
6
 2) procedural (for example, prosecutors might disproportionately pursue 
                                                 
4
 See John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row’s Population 
and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 167 (2004) (examining the 
composition of the death rows in eight states and finding that “[t]he different death sentence rates 
for black defendant-black victim cases and black defendant-white victim cases confirm the well-
known race of- victim effect”); Anthony Amsterdam, Symposium on Pursuing Racial Fairness in 
Criminal Justice: Twenty Years After McCleskey v. Kemp: Opening Remarks: Race and the Death 
Penalty Before and After McCleskey, 39 COLIM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 34 (2007) (“Most of the 
studies find that the race of the victim is the principal determiner of sentence: killers of white 
victims are far more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of African-American victims. 
Some studies find bias against African-American defendants as well, but this is ordinarily weaker 
and is usually masked by the race-of-victim bias because (1) the overwhelming number of killings 
committed by African-American perpetrators involve African-American victims; (2) very few 
cases are found in which white perpetrators are convicted of killing African-American victims; 
and (3) almost no one convicted of killing an African-American victim gets the death sentence.”).  
5
 See Mona Lynch and Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic Divide: Racialized Decision 
Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 577 (2011) (noting “[s]everal recent 
studies have documented racial bias against Black defendants, apart from the interactive effect that 
the race of defendant has with the race of victim” and indicating that race of defendant bias is 
“especially likely to operate in the juries’ penalty phase decision making”).  
6
 There are several possible explanations important to mention, but not necessary to expound upon 
in text. First, prosecutors might face more death penalty related pressure from families of White 
victims than Black victims See, e.g., David Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination 
and the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411, 1449-1450 (2004)  [hereinafter Baldus & Woodworth, Legitimacy of 
Capital Punishment] (“Support for capital punishment is substantially lower in Black communities 
than it is in white communities. Thus, to the extent that prosecutors take into account the views of 
the victim's family, the request for a capital prosecution is likely to be higher when the victim is 
white. Moreover, because most prosecutors are white, the families of white victims are more likely 
to meet with the prosecutor and press their views on the death penalty.”). Second, Black jurors 
might be less willing to impose the death penalty, but more likely to reside in areas where Black 
homicide victims are located. See Blume et al, supra at n. 4 (explaining “prosecutors are more 
likely to seek death sentences when they believe they can obtain them. In urban communities with 
a strong minority presence, prosecutors may face juries that are more reluctant to impose the death 
penalty, or those communities may select prosecutors who are reluctant to seek the death penalty); 
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the death penalty for crimes against White victims; jurors have a difficult time 
empathizing with the mitigating evidence presented by Black defendants and, 
conversely, victim impact testimony might disproportionately magnify the loss of 
White victims compared to non-White victims
7
); and 3) structural (for example, 
the penological justifications for capital punishment—i.e. retribution—might be 
inextricably tied to race; death-qualifying jurors might inadvertently racialize 
capital trials despite its purpose of promoting impartiality).  
No convincing evidence suggests that any one of these factors consistently 
accounts for all—or most—of the unjustified racial disparities at play in the 
administration of capital punishment. Indeed, these factors appear to matter in 
varying degrees across jurisdictions (and, for that matter, over time within the 
same jurisdiction). We propose that a unifying current running through each of 
these partial plausible explanations is the notion that the human mind can 
automatically introduce massive bias into the seemingly neutral concepts and 
processes of death penalty administration.   
                                                                                                                                     
id. at 203 (“African Americans are, in general, more reluctant to impose the death penalty, tend to 
murder other African Americans, and tend to commit within-race murders in communities with 
substantial African-American populations.”); id. at 203 (“Prosecutors may be reluctant to seek the 
death penalty because they expect the jury to be reluctant to impose it. Since this effect should 
occur more in communities with larger African-American populations, where most African-
American murders occur, African-American presence on death row should be understated.”). See 
also G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death Penalty, 85 
WASH. L. REV. 425 (2010) (documenting the tendency for federal prosecutors to seek—and 
obtain—death sentences that occurred in counties with high African American populations and 
low death sentencing rates, and noting that the change of venire to the federal district court 
significantly “whitens” the jury pool).  Finally, crimes committed against White victims might 
tend to be disproportionately aggravated—and thus death eligible. See Blume, et al., supra at n. 4 
(noting that “murders involving multiple victims” and “murders of strangers” are often considered 
to be “more deathworthy,” and arguing that Black defendant / white victim cases are stranger 
murder scenarios more often than any other race of the defendant / race of the victim 
combination). But see id. at 202 n.71 (cautioning against attributing too much explanatory power 
to differences in number of victims or stranger status because “murder characteristics [ ] were not 
helpful in explaining interstate differences in death row sizes”). Though this phenomenon appears 
to explain some of the disparities in the death sentencing of white and Black defendants in white 
victim cases, it does nothing to “explain the extraordinarily low death sentence rate in Black 
defendant-Black victim cases.” Id. 202. 
7
 Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly), in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
ACROSS THE LAW 229 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, eds. 2012). Others suggest that the 
dynamic might run in the opposite direction: prosecutors devalue the worth of Black victims. See 
Blume et al, supra at note 4 (noting that “[s]ince most Black offenders murder Black victims, 
race-based prosecutorial reluctance to seek the death penalty in this category of cases, or of juries 
to impose the death penalty, drives the racial imbalance” and providing as possible explanations 
that “Black life is valued less highly than white life” or “the white-dominated social structure is 
less threatened by Black-victim homicide”). 
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Few scholars have relied on modern social science methods or evidence to 
deconstruct the ways the human mind may unwittingly contribute to racial 
disparities in the death penalty.
8
 This Article begins to fill that gap by considering 
racial disparities in capital punishment through the lens of implicit racial bias. 
Implicit bias refers to the automatic attitudes and stereotypes that appear in 
individuals.
9
  These biases have been shown to affect a broad range of behaviors 
and decisions, and the breadth of knowledge continues to expand.
10
  Implicit 
biases, for example, have been shown to predict the way economic allocations are 
made,
11
 medical treatments are rendered,
12
 job interviews are offered,
13
 and more.  
Yet knowledge of implicit cognitive processes has yet to be adequately 
considered an underlying source of inequity in capital punishment.
14
  To address 
                                                 
8
 Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539 (2004); Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death and the Complicitous Mind, 58 
DEPAUL L. REV. 599 (2009); Smith & Cohen, supra note 7. 
9
 For a summary of implicit bias social science research, see Justin D. Levinson, Danielle K. 
Young & Laurie A. Rudman, Implicit Racial Bias:  A Social Science Overview, in IMPLICIT 
RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 7, at 9 [hereinafter Levinson et al., A Social Science 
Overview] (citing John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior:  Direct Effects of Trait 
Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 230 
(1996); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice:  Their Automatic and Controlled 
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 9 (1989); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing 
Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.  876 (2004); 
Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking:  Activation and Application of 
Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509 (1991); Anthony Greenwald et al., 
Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test:  III.  Meta Analysis of Predictive Validity, 
97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (2009)).  For a more theoretical perspective underlying 
work on implicit bias, see Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE 
NATURE OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 123 (Henry L. Roediger 
III et al. eds., 2001); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: 
Attitudes, Self-esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995). 
10
 See Levinson et al., A Social Science Overview, supra note 9.  See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., 
The Police Officer’s Dilemma:  Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening 
Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314 (2002); Joshua Correll et al., Across the 
Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007); Greenwald, et al., supra note 9. , 
11
 Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association Test, 10 
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359 (2007).   
12
 Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias among Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis 
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007). 
13
 Dan-Olof Rooth,  Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence 
17 LABOUR ECON. 523 (2010); Jens Agerstrom & Dan-Olof Rooth, The Role of Automatic Obesity 
Stereotypes in Real Hiring Discrimination, 96 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 790 (2011). 
14
 See Smith & Cohen , supra note 7.  Several scholars have suggested that implicit bias plays a 
role in death penalty disparities, but have yet to empirically or deeply explore these hypotheses.  
See, e.g., Lucy Adams, Comment, Death by Discretion: Who Decides Who Lives and Dies in the 
United States of America? 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 381, 389–90 (2005) (stating that “a white prosecutor 
may — consciously or subconsciously — perceive a crime to be more ‘outrageously or wantonly 
vile, horrible, or inhuman’ if it is alleged to have been committed against a white victim” (quoting 
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this knowledge gap, we conducted an empirical study of jury eligible citizens 
from six of the most active death penalty states.
15
 The results of the study 
underscore the potentially powerful role of implicit bias and suggest that racial 
disparities in the modern death penalty could be linked to the very concepts 
entrusted to maintain the continued constitutionality of capital punishment: its 
retributive core, its empowerment of juries to express the cultural consensus of 
local communities, and the post-Gregg regulatory measures that promised to 
eliminate arbitrary death sentencing.  
Empirical research on race and the death penalty outside the context of implicit 
bias has been a model of productivity in early empirical legal scholarship.  In a 
particularly busy period beginning in the early 1970s, researchers investigated 
topics spanning from the role of death qualification on the composition of the 
jury,
16
 to the now famous race of victim effects that (over thirty years after they 
were first discovered) continue to define the make-up of death rows everywhere.
17
  
Much of this work has relied on modern and sophisticated empirical methods.  
Yet empirical work on implicit bias has barely scratched the surface of issues 
                                                                                                                                     
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(7) (1994)); Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial 
Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on 
Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2083, 2094–2106 (2004) 
(considering the extreme deference given to prosecutors); Rory K. Little, What Federal 
Prosecutors Really Think: The Puzzle of Statistical Race Disparity Versus Specific Guilt, and the 
Specter of Timothy McVeigh, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1591, 1599–1600 (2004) (addressing 
“unconscious race empathy” that white prosecutors may have with white defendants or white 
victims); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race of the 
Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1819 (1998) (alluding to unconscious biases 
produced due to similarities between prosecutors and victims); Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent nor 
Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform 
Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 140–41 (2003) (proposing that it “is likely that 
unconscious racism influences a prosecutor even more than it affects others”).  
15
 Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas. 
16
 See, e.g., J. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-
Qualified Jury:  An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 12 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1970); J. 
Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make the Jury More Likely to 
Convcit?  Some Evidence from California, 3 Woodrow Wilson L.J. 11 (1980); Claudia L. Cowen 
et al., Effects of Death Qualification, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53 (1984); Robert Fitzgerald & 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control:  Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46–48 (1984); Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries:  The 
Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984); George L. 
Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a “Death Qualified Jury” on the Guilt Determination Process, 
84 Harv. L. Rev. 567 (1971); William C. Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction 
Proneness:  The Translation of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 109 (1984).  
17
 David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, Quantitative Proof of Intentional Discrimination,1 
EVALUATION QUARTERLY 53 (1977);  David C. Baldus et al., Identifying Comparatively Excessive 
Sentences of Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980); David C. Baldus et al., 
Comparative Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. 
CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 661 (1983); BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE, supra note 3. 
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related to race and the death penalty.
18
  In an effort to begin an empirical 
consideration of implicit bias in the death penalty, we designed a study that 
examined the role of implicit bias in a broad range of jury eligible citizens in six 
leading death penalty states.  Our study pursued a range of hypotheses relevant to 
racial bias and the death penalty, including:  (1) do jury eligible citizens in death 
penalty states harbor implicit racial stereotypes, such as stereotypes that Blacks 
are aggressive, lazy, and worthless, and Whites are virtuous, hard-working, and 
valuable; (2) do death qualified jurors hold stronger implicit and explicit racial 
biases than non-death qualified jurors; and (3) do implicit and explicit biases 
predict death penalty decision-making depending upon the race of the defendant 
and the victim.    
We hypothesized that capital jurors possess implicit racial biases both as to 
traditional racial stereotypes as well as moral stereotypes related to the value of 
human life (specifically, that White people are more valuable than Black people).  
We also predicted that death qualification, a legal process designed to provide 
fairness in the administration of the death penalty, actually functions to remove 
the least racially biased jurors from juries.  And finally, we hypothesized that 
jurors’ implicit biases would help predict their ultimate life and death decisions. 
Results of the study confirmed several of our hypotheses.  To begin with, we 
found, as expected, that jury eligible citizens harbored the two different kinds of 
implicit racial bias we tested:  implicit racial stereotypes about Blacks and Whites 
generally, as well as implicit associations between race and the value of life 
(using a measure we designed called the “Value of Life IAT”
19
).  In addition, we 
                                                 
18
 See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 8.  In Eisenberg and Johnson’s study, the researchers 
tested whether a sample of capital defense attorneys held implicit racial bias, as employed by (a 
paper and pencil version of) the IAT.  They found that the attorneys, a group that one would 
expect to resist such biases, harbored similar biases to the rest of the population. Id. at 1556.  
19
 IAT stands for Implicit Association Test.  The IAT:  
pairs an attitude object (such as a racial group) with an evaluative dimension 
(good or bad) and tests how response accuracy and speed indicate implicit and 
automatic attitudes and stereotypes.  Participants sit at a computer and are 
asked to pair an attitude object (for example, Black or white, man or woman; 
fat or thin) with either an evaluative dimension (for example, good or bad) or 
an attribute dimension (for example, home or career, science or arts) by 
pressing a response key as quickly as they can.  For example, in one task, 
participants are told to quickly pair together pictures of African-American faces 
with positive words from the evaluative dimension.  In a second task, 
participants are obliged to pair African-American faces with negative words.  
The difference in the speed at which the participants can perform the two tasks 
is interpreted as the strength of the attitude (or in the case of attributes, the 
strength of the stereotype).  For example, if participants perform the first task 
faster than the second task, they are showing implicitly positive attitudes 
toward Blacks. Similarly, if they are faster to perform tasks that oblige 
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found, as predicted, that death qualified jurors harbored stronger racial biases than 
excluded jurors;
20
 these differences in racial bias levels were revealed on both 
implicit and self-reported (explicit) measures.  Turning to the mock trial scenario 
we conducted, although our overall results did not replicate the known racial 
effects on ultimate life and death decisions, results of the study showed that 
implicit racial bias predicted race of defendant effects.
21
  That is, the more the 
mock jurors showed implicit bias that related to race and the value of human life, 
the more likely they were to convict a Black defendant relative to a White 
defendant.  In addition we found that self-reported (explicit) racial bias predicted 
death decisions based on the race of the victim. 
This Article considers what an implicit bias examination can contribute to the 
discussion of racial disparities and capital punishment and presents the empirical 
study we conducted to test our hypotheses.  The Article is organized as follows:  
Section II frames the issue by presenting the historical and constitutional problem. 
It considers the history of race in the death penalty, and specifically focuses on 
the modern prevalence of race of victim effects and the constitutional challenges 
surrounding racial inequalities in capital punishment.  Section III introduces 
implicit bias to the capital context.  It briefly summarizes empirical implicit bias 
scholarship in the criminal justice realm, proposes an implicit bias model of jury 
decision-making that could be relevant both to non-capital and capital cases, and 
presents a theory that attempts to deconstruct the role of implicit bias in capital 
cases.  Section IV details the empirical study.  It begins by describing the methods 
and materials of the experiment, which was conducted in six leading death 
penalty states, and concludes by presenting the results.  Among other things, the 
results of the study found that death qualified jurors are more racially biased (both 
implicitly and explicitly) than non-death qualified jurors and also that both 
implicit and explicit biases can play a role in the ultimate decision of whether a 
defendant lives or dies.  Section V considers the implications of the study from 
multiple perspectives and contextualizes the results both in legal scholarship and 
in terms of constitutional jurisprudence. We conclude with a brief examination of 
future pathways for identifying and assessing the locations where racial disparities 
continue to plague the administration of the death penalty. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
categorizing women with home than tasks that oblige categorizing women with 
career, they are showing implicit sex stereotyping. 
Levinson et al., A Social Science Overview, supra note 9 at 16-17. 
20
 These jurors would be excluded because they would not be willing to convict when death was a 
possible penalty or to impose the death penalty after a conviction. 
21
 See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text. 
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II.  RACE AND DEATH:  STILL INTERTWINED AND STILL LEGAL 
 
The close connection between race and the death penalty has deep historical and 
cultural roots that have been considered by both the Supreme Court and by legal 
scholars for generations.  This section begins with a brief sketch of the historical 
relationship between race and the death penalty in the period before Furman v. 
Georgia,
22
 the 1972 decision that ended the pre-modern death penalty in America. 
It then details the doctrinal structure used to regulate capital punishment since 
Furman. Next, it considers where unjustified racial disparities enter into the 
administration of capital punishment and examines both how scholars have 
understood why such disparities persist as well as offers new perspectives that 
may further illuminate America’s continuing cultural and legal struggles with race 
and death.  
A. Race and the Unregulated Death Penalty: From Lynching Mobs to 
Furman v. Georgia 
 
Race and capital punishment share a long, intertwined history in the United 
States. Pre-Civil War states formally set the punishment for some crimes at death 
when committed by a Black man and a lesser sentence when committed by a 
White man.
 23
 These states also labeled some crimes as death-eligible (or not) 
based on whether the victim was White or Black.
24
 Formal discrimination faded 
eventually, but the fear of freed Black men escalated across the South (and, as 
Black Americans moved North and West, outside of the South, too). This fear 
dovetailed with the argument that the death penalty was a necessary tool for 
maintaining social order, especially against the threat of Blacks. For example, in 
1927, the Governor of Arkansas, addressing “one of the South’s most serious 
problems,” i.e., “the negro question,”
25
 argued that because Blacks were “still 
quite primitive, and in general culture and advancement in a childish state of 
progress, [i]f the death penalty were to be removed from our statute books, the 
                                                 
22
 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
23
 See Amsterdam, supra note 4 (“Prior to the Civil War, all Southern States provided by law that 
slaves - and sometimes free Negroes as well - should be sentenced to death for crimes punishable 
by lesser penalties when whites committed them. After the War ended slavery, formal legal 
discrimination against free Negroes and Mulattoes was perpetuated by the Black Codes; African-
Americans continued to be punished by death for crimes with lesser punishments for whites.”).  
24
 Id.  
25
 See BANNER, supra note 1 at 228. 
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tendency to commit deeds of violence would be heightened [because] the greater 
number of the race do not maintain the same ideals as the Whites.”
26
  
Other commentators proposed expansion—or at least opposed abolition—of 
capital punishment on the grounds the death penalty served as a structurally 
manageable alternative to lynching.
27
 The general argument was that 
“southerners’ strong desire to exact retribution for crime would result in even 
more lynching,”
28
 unless the death penalty remained intact.
29
 The following 
excerpt from an editorial in a Shreveport, Louisiana newspaper in 1914 illustrates 
the thrust of the idea: 
There are “suggestions from some of the newspapers of the State 
that Louisiana follow the lead of a few other States and abolish the 
death penalty,” but “[w]ould not one result be to increase the 
number of lynchings? Would the murderer be permitted to reach 
State prison in safety from the vengeance of an outraged 
citizenship . . .?”
30
  
Beginning in the 1920s, the Supreme Court poked around the edges of state 
capital statues by intervening in truly abhorrent death penalty cases where Black 




 Id. at 228 (“Southern whites turned toward alternative forms of racial subjugation, and one of 
those was the death penalty. That capital punishment was necessary to restrain a primitive, 
animalistic Black population became an article of faith among white southerners that persisted 
well into the twentieth century.”). 
28
 Id. at 229. 
29
 Id.; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 303 (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting the claim that capital 
punishment is constitutional because it “satisfies the popular demand for grievous condemnation 
of abhorrent crimes and thus prevents disorder, lynching, and attempts by private citizens to take 
the law into their own hand”) G. Ben Cohen, The Racial Geography of Retribution, 10 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 65, 87 (2012) (“[T]he broad correlation between counties with high death sentencing 
rates today and counties that had multiple lynchings in the early 1900s justifies specific inquiry.”); 
id. (citing Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Centennial Symposium: A Century Of Criminal 
Justice: I. Crimes And Punishment: Capital Punishment: A Century Of Discontinuous Debate  
Summer, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 646-662 (2010) (labeling “the death penalty as a 
necessary antidote to lynching”)); id. (noting that “[s]upporters of capital punishment urged that 
the maintenance of the death penalty was a necessary antidote to lynching; indeed, it may well be 
that some who might otherwise have opposed the death penalty came reluctantly to support it as a 
lesser evil, given that the anti-lynching voices tended to come from the more politically 
progressive members of communities in which lynching was most prevalent”). 
30
 Cohen, supra note 29, at 94 (citing Editorial, The Shreveport Times, April 13, 1914). Other 
commentators suggest expanding the death penalty based on the need to control freed Blacks. See 
BANNER, supra note 1 (“Virginia chemist and farmer Edmund Ruffin complained that the free 
slaves were committing so many crimes that “burglary, robbery and arson ought to be again 
punished by death.”). 
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defendants received visible shoddy justice—
31
 cases that legal historian Michael 





and “sentences designed to appease an angry mob.”
34
 By the 1960s, the problem 
of racially disparate death penalty schemes had bubbled to the surface. The South 
was the center of gravity for these observed disparities, and nowhere was the 
impact greater than in the application of the death penalty to the crime of rape: all 
but two of the eighteen jurisdictions that still punished rape capitally in 1953 were 
Southern jurisdictions and greater than 90% of Americans executed for rape in the 
eight preceding decades had been Black Americans.
35
 Indeed, the improper 
influence of race on the administration of the death penalty contributed to the 
United States Supreme Court halting death sentencing nationally in 1972. In 
Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court struck down Georgia and Texas death 
penalty statutes and placed a de facto prohibition on all then existing capital 
sentencing schemes.
36
 The concurring opinions of Justice Douglas and Justice 
Marshall highlighted the racially unequal application of the death penalty among 
the races.
37
 Justice Douglas cited to the final report of Lyndon Johnson’s 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Criminal 
Justice, which concluded that “[t]he death sentence is disproportionately imposed 
and carried out on the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups.”
38
 
Justice Douglas also cited to a comprehensive study of the Texas death penalty 
                                                 
31
 BANNER, supra note 1 at 215 (“the Court had intervened in a series of Southern cases in which 
violence and intimidation had produced death sentences that it regarded as a travesty of justice”); 
id. (listing, inter alia, Moore v. Demspey—overturning convictions against six Black men where 
their confessions were produced by torture—, Powell v Alabama and Norris v. Alabama—
reversing the convictions of the Scottsboro boys, who were Black men convicted of raping two 
white woman and tried in a trial that reflected mob-rule rather than the rule of law—, and Patton v. 
Mississippi—reversing conviction where all white jury imposed a death sentence against a Black 
defendant in a jury with a 1/3 Black American population). 
32
 Michael Karlman, Scottsboro, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 379, 422 and 426 (2009). 
33
 Id. at 393 (quoting DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 160 
(rev. ed. 1979). 
34
 Id. at 382 (“Some jurisdictions actually enacted laws deisgned to prevent lynchings by 
providing for special terms of court to convene within days  of alleged rapes and other  incendiary 
crimes.  In many instances, law enforcement officers explicitly promised would-be lynch mobs 
that black defendants would be quickly tried and executed if the mob desisted, and prosecutors 
appealed to juries to convict in order to reward mobs for good behavior and thus encourage similar 
restraint in the future.”). 
35
 See Donnald H. Partington, The Incidence of the Death Penalty for Rape in Virginia, 22 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 43, 53 (“The execution statistics show that the total number of executions for rape 
in the states imposing the death penalty during all or some of the period, was 444; of these, 399 
were Negroes . . ..”). 
36
 Furman v. Georgia, supra note 22 at 239-40.  
37
 Id. at 251, 364 (“The Negro convicted of rape is far more likely to get the death penalty than a 
term sentence . . ..” and “It is immediately apparent that Negroes were executed far more often 
than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population.”). 
38
 Id. at 251.  
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from 1924-1968, which found “several instances where a White and a Negro were 
co-defendants, the White was sentenced to life imprisonment or a term of years, 
and the Negro was given the death penalty” and that “[t]he Negro convicted of 
rape is far more likely to get the death penalty than a term sentence, whereas 





In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall added that it becomes “immediately 
apparent [from historical execution statistics] that Negroes were executed far 
more often than whites in proportion to their percentage of the population.”
40
 
Marshall continued: “Studies indicate that while the higher rate of execution 
among Negroes is partially due to a higher rate of crime, there is evidence of 
racial discrimination.”
41
 After considering the arguments put forward by Douglas 
and Marshall, Justice Stewart wrote, “[m]y concurring Brothers have 
demonstrated that, if any basis can be discerned for the selection of these few to 
be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally impermissible basis of race.”
42
 
Nonetheless, Stewart concluded that “racial discrimination has not been proved,” 
and thus he “put it to one side.”
43
  The Furman court simply held in a one 
paragraph per curiam opinion that “the imposition and carrying out of the death 
penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,” which left the death penalty temporarily 




B. Race and the Regulated Death Penalty: From Furman v. Georgia 
to the Present.   
 
In the years immediately following Furman, state legislatures wasted no time in 
recalibrating and reenacting death penalty schemes that would withstand 
constitutional scrutiny.
45
  Just four years after Furman, the Court gave its blessing 
to capital punishment in the 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgia,
46
 noting that statutes 
like the newly minted Georgia statute contain procedural safeguards that help 
                                                 
39
 Id. at 250-251. 
40
 Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
41
 Id.  
42
 Furman v. Georgia supra note 22 at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
43
 Id.  
44
 Id. at 240. 
45
 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-180 (1976) (“The most marked indication of society's 
endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative response to Furman. The 
legislatures of at least 35 States
 
have enacted new statutes that provide for the death penalty for at 
least some crimes that result in the death of another person.”). 
46
 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
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guard against arbitrary or discriminatory imposition of the death penalty.
47
 The 
Court noted that some of the procedural safeguards that Georgia adopted were 
aimed at stamping out racial arbitrariness: they included a “questionnaire [for trial 
judges to complete with] six questions designed to disclose whether race played a 
role in the case” and a “provision for appellate review,” which included a 
requirement that the Georgia Supreme Court explicitly decide “[w]hether the 
sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any 
other arbitrary factor.”
48
 The Gregg Court, then, did not eschew the importance of 
a race-neutral death penalty, but rather it placed its faith in the ability of the 
revised sentencing statutes to eliminate the importance of race in deciding who 
lives and who dies. 
 
The Court’s conclusion in Gregg that sufficient procedural regulation could stamp 
out racial and other arbitrariness from capital sentencing has been a source of 
great skepticism.
49
 The biggest post-Gregg race-based systemic challenge to the 
modern death penalty came in the 1987 case of McCleskey v. Kemp.
50
  Warren 
McCleskey, a Black man, had been convicted and sentenced to death in Georgia 
for the murder of a White police officer.
51
  McCleskey urged the Supreme Court 
to reverse his death sentence due to the influence of racial arbitrariness in the 
administration of the Georgia death-sentencing scheme.
52
 To support this 
proposition, McClesksey introduced the results of two large-scale statistical 
studies of more than 2,000 Georgia capital cases.
53
 These studies, known 
collectively as “the Baldus study,” demonstrated that a capital defendant who 
                                                 
47
 Id. at 180 (explaining how “recently adopted statutes have attempted to address the concerns 
expressed by the Court in Furman primarily [] by specifying the factors to be weighed and the 
procedures to be followed in deciding when to impose a capital sentence”). 
48
 Id. at 211-212. Though many states passed statutes that contained safeguards similar to those 
enacted in Georgia, states did—and do—tend to give them perfunctory treatment. See e.g. See 
Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg: 
Only “The Appearance of Justice,” 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 140 (1996) (noting 
that more than 30 states passed similar safeguards, but that most of these states either perform 
perfunctory review or else have repealed proportionality / arbitrariness review altogether). 
49
 See, e.g., Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two 
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment," 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995) 
(describing the Court’s then twenty year old Gregg experiment and concluding that procedural 
regulation failed to satisfy its Eighth Amendment objectives).  
50
 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
51
 Id. at 283 (noting the race of both McCleskey and the police officer).  
52
 Id. at 291 (“[McCleskey] argues that race has infected the administration of Georgia's statute in 
two ways: persons who murder whites are more likely to be sentenced to death than persons who 
murder blacks, and black murderers are more likely to be sentenced to death than white murderers. 
As a black defendant who killed a white victim, McCleskey claims that the Baldus study 
demonstrates that he was discriminated against because of his race and because of the race of his 
victim.”). 
53
 Id. at 286-287. 
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killed a White victim was more than four times as likely to be sentenced to death 
than a capital defendant who murdered a Black victim.
54
 The study also 
considered the likelihood of a death sentence given the various race of the 
defendant / race of the victim combinations. It found that the death penalty was 
imposed in “22% of the cases involving Black defendants and White victims; 8% 
of the cases involving White defendants and White victims; 1% of the cases 
involving Black defendants and Black victims; and 3% of the cases involving 
White defendants and Black victims.”
55
 The Baldus study demonstrated (as 
Justice Brennan explained) that “[o]f the more than 200 variables potentially 
relevant to a sentencing decision, race of the victim [was] a powerful explanation 
for variation in death sentence rates—as powerful as nonracial aggravating factors 





McCleskey used the findings of the Baldus study to support his racial arbitrariness 
claim on two main grounds. First, McCleksley argued that the results of the 
statistical studies sufficed to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination, 
which, unless rebutted by Georgia, is enough to violate the Equal Protection 
clause.
57
 Second, he argued that the study demonstrated a constitutionally 
intolerable risk under the Eighth Amendment that racial bias infected the Georgia 
death-sentencing scheme and thus McClesksey could not be guaranteed that he 





The Court rejected McCleskey’s challenge on a variety of grounds. First, it 
rejected the Equal Protection challenge, finding “the Baldus study [to be] clearly 
insufficient to support an inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey's 
case acted with discriminatory purpose.”
59
 The Court explained “the application 
of an inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision in a trial 
and sentencing simply is not comparable to the application of an inference drawn 
from general statistics [in other settings such as petit jury composition or 
employment discrimination cases where such inferences are permitted].”
60
 It 
reasoned that the death penalty was a genre particularly unsuited for this type of 
statistical inference because in the capital context each capital jury “is unique in 
                                                 
54




 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
57
 Id. at 291 
58
 Id. at 299.  
59
 Id. at 297. 
60
 Id. at 294-295. 
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its composition,” is “selected from a properly constituted venire” and renders a 
final decision that “rest[s] on consideration of innumerable factors that vary 
according to the characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of the 
particular capital offense.”
61
 After noting its own “unceasing efforts to eradicate 
racial prejudice from our criminal justice system,”
62
 the Court characterized the 
Baldus study as “at most . . . indicat[ing] a discrepancy that appears to correlate 
with race,”
63
 “decline[d] to assume that what is unexplained is invidious,”
64
 and 
“h[e]ld that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a constitutionally significant 
risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process.”
65
 Finally, the 
Court worried that if it “accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has 
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced 
with similar claims as to other types of penalty.”
66
 This fear, Justice Brennan 
quipped in his dissent, is best labeled “a fear of too much justice.”
67
 
The discouragement from the McCleskey Court has not stopped researchers from 
documenting continued racial arbitrariness in the administration of capital 
sentencing schemes.
68
 Indeed,  a host of empirical studies measuring race of the 
defendant effects, race of the victim effects, or both, have been published since 
McCleskey.
69
 Most of the post-McCleskey studies that report unjustified racial 
                                                 
61
 Id.  
62
 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. at 309. 
63




 Id.  
66
 Id. at 315. 
67
 Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
68
 See, e.g., infra at notes 82-87; Lynch and Haney, supra note 5 at 576 (noting that “numerous 
scholars have used regression analysis to document the influence of race (particularly victim race) 
on death penalty decision making in a number of other states [besides Georgia], including 
California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina”).  
69
 Id.; see, e.g., Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 106 (1984) 
(finding “remarkably stable and consistent” race of the victim effects “in the imposition of the 
death penalty under post-Furman statutes in the eight states [that the authors] examined” and 
explaining that the “legitimate sentencing variables that we considered could not explain these 
disparities, whether we controlled for these variables one at a time, organized them into a scale of 
aggravation, or used multiple regression analysis”). But see David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, 
David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner, Barbara Broffitt, Racial Discrimination and the Death 
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Recent Findings from 
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1676-1760 (1998) (finding that Black defendants who 
committed mid-range capital crimes were four times more likely to receive a sentence of death 
than white defendants that committed similarly aggravated crimes, even after adjusting for case-
related factors); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of 
Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 386 (2006) 
(finding that the degree with which the offenders in the Philadelphia dataset possess 
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disparities in the imposition of the death penalty have found that the influence of 
racial bias centers on the race of the victim rather than on the race of the 
defendant.
70
 In other words, the death penalty is imposed disproportionately often 
for the homicide of White victims. This effect is particularly stark—as it was in 
the Baldus studies presented in McCleskey
71




The evidence comes from death penalty jurisdictions across the country. For 
example, a study of death-eligible homicide cases from 1990-2005 in southwest 
Arkansas found “large and highly statistically significant” death-sentencing 
disparities in Black-defendant / White-victim cases.
73
 Indeed, in the two Arkansas 
judicial circuits included in the study, the only death-eligible cases (n=63) to 
result in a death sentence involved Black defendants and White victims.
74
 A 2010 
review of 1,100 death-eligible homicides that occurred in East Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana over a twenty-eight year period similarly found that though Blacks 
constitute four-fifths of homicide victims in East Baton Rouge, over half of the 
cases in which a death sentence was obtained involved a White victim.
75
 A 2010 
study that examined more than 15,000 homicide cases across a quarter-century 
span found that killing a White person in North Carolina is associated with a 
threefold increase in the likelihood of receiving a death sentence over killing a 
                                                                                                                                     
stereotypically Afrocentric facial features predicts death-sentencing). The reason why race of the 
victim effects are not found in this study is because the then-district attorney of Philadelphia, Lynn 
Abrahams, prosecuted nearly every case capitally if it was death-eligible. This also provides some 
support for the idea that charging practices—more than jury determinations—drive race of the 
victim effects.  Regarding the lack of consistent findings of race of defendants, Justin Levinson 
has argued that this inconsistency may actually cover up true race of defendant disparities.  In a 
theory called “Racial Bias Masking Hypothesis,” Levinson argued that the construction of the case 
facts used by empirical researchers themselves may have been automatically skewed (by implicit 
bias) in such a way as to wash away race of defendant effects.  See Levinson, Race, Death, and the 
Complicitous Mind, supra note 8.  Relying on research beginning with classic social psychology 
experiments on how stories are told and retold, Levinson claimed that when researchers attempted 
to compare like crimes by white and Black defendants, they may have actually been comparing 
defendants who had, in actuality, committed different severities of crimes (Whites more severe 
than Blacks).  See Id. at 603 (citing GORDON W. ALPORT & LEO J. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF RUMOR (1947)).  
70
 See, e.g., Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death, supra note 69. 
71
 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-287. 
72
 See, e.g., infra at notes 82-87.  
73
 David C. Baldus, Julie Brain, Neil A. Weiner, George Woodworth, Evidence of Racial 
Discrimination in the Use of the Death Penalty: A Story from Southwest Arkansas (1990-2005) 
with Special Reference to the Case of Death Row Inmate Frank Williams, Jr., 76 TENN. L. REV. 
555, 573 (2009).  
74
 Id. at 586.  
75
 Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish, 1990–
2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647 (2011). 




 These race of the victim disparities persist at the federal level, 
too: a 2000 study conducted by the United States Department of Justice found that 
local United States Attorneys sought authorization from the Attorney General to 
pursue a federal capital prosecution twice as often when the victim was non-Black 
than when the victim was Black.
77
 Similarly, a 2011 study found statistically 
significant race of the victim effects in the context of the military death penalty.
78
  
These differences could not “be explained by legitimate case characteristics or the 
effects of chance in a race-neutral system.”
79
 These studies demonstrate that the 
race of the victim effects first demonstrated in McCleskey have been consistently 
replicated across many jurisdictions by a number of researchers over thirty years.  
Researchers also find race of the defendant effects, though these effects are more 
modest today than they were forty years ago.
80
 The decreased disparities probably 
stem from restricting the death penalty to homicide offenses. More specifically, 
first a decrease in capital rape prosecutions, and then the Court’s decision in 
Coker v. Georgia
81
 to ban the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman, led to 
a decrease in race of defendant disparities because capital rape convictions 
constituted the largest source of such disparities.
82
 The decreased defendant-based 
disparities—and indeed the lack of statistically significant findings in most studies 
that focus on all death-eligible homicides in a jurisdiction—also are explained, at 
least in part, by the fact that race of the defendant discrimination appears mostly 
to play out during the penalty phase of a capital trial and not at the stage where 
prosecutors decide whether to pursue a case capitally.
83
 The charging stage is a far 
more important sorting tool in the modern era than are capital trials because the 
vast majority of homicide cases (even those that are death-eligible) do not proceed 
                                                 
76
 Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in North Carolina 1980–
2007, 89 N.C. L. REV. (2011). 
77
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH  PENALTY  SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL  
SURVEY (1988–2000) (Sept. 12, 2000), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html. 
78
 David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: The 
Experience of the United States Armed Forces (1984-2005), 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 




 See id. at 1273 n.144 (finding race of the defendant effects in Philadelphia capital cases from 
1983-1993); Scott Phillips, Continued Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment:  
The Rosenthal Era, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 131 (2012) (finding race of the defendant effects in 
Harris County, Texas).  
81
 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
82
 BANNER, supra at 1. 
83
 Lynch & Haney, supra at note 5 (“The intriguing finding that the race of victim appears to be an 
important factor-consciously or not-for prosecutors with the power to seek a death sentence, but 
that juries appear to be more influenced by defendant characteristics can be explained by the 
context in which both groups-prosecutors and jurors-operate.”). 
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to a capital trial.
84
 Professors Lynch and Haney hypothesize that one normally 
does not find significant race of defendant effects until the jury-decision making 
stage because (at least from the point of view of a prosecutor) the pre-trial stage is 
more likely to focus on the victim of the crime whereas the penalty phase of a 
capital trial is centered on the defendant.
85
 Regardless of whether race of victim 
and race of defendant effects persist in equal proportions, the broader point is that 
the Court’s Eighth Amendment regulatory framework appears to have failed in 
practice to eliminate unjustified racial disparities from the administration of 
capital punishment.  
 
C. Explanations for Continued Racial Disparities 
 
In light of the massive disparities in the administration of the death penalty, 
present and past, there has been no shortage of scholarly attempts to deconstruct 
the reasons behind this continuing and disturbing trend. This section addresses 
why racial disparities persist, both by considering legal commentators’ work, as 
well as by proposing new implicit bias-based explanations. We sketch three 
categories of explanations that scholars have advanced to explain racial disparities 
in capital sentencing. The first category is a spatial and cultural explanation: 
jurisdictions that sentence people to death regularly tend to possess a core lower-
status minority group population (“outsiders”) and a thick ring of higher-status 
White citizens (“spatial”), and also tend be more “parochial,” which results in the 
community punishing most harshly crimes committed by lower-status outsiders 
against higher status insiders (“cultural”).
86
 The second category, which is 
procedural, has three component parts. First, it questions whether the death-
qualification, a central tenet in death penalty jurisprudence that was enacted for 
the purpose of eradicating impartiality, has the unintended consequences of 
increasing unjustified racial disparities. It also includes two descriptions of the 
stages where racial factors can enter into capital punishment process. The most 
important stage involves prosecutorial charging decisions. The other important 
                                                 
84
 Felongy Defendants, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=231 (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). 
85
 Lynch & Haney, supra note 5 at 586 (“The intriguing finding that the race of victim appears to 
be an important factor-consciously or not-for prosecutors with the power to seek a death sentence, 
but that juries appear to be more influenced by defendant characteristics can be explained by the 
context in which both groups-prosecutors and jurors-operate.”); id. (“The prosecutor's staff 
(attorneys, investigators, victim-witness staff) is much more likely to interact with and focus on 
the victim's family, particularly in the early stages of case processing, so differential empathic 
bonds may be formed as a function of race (among other influences).”). 
86
 James Liebman and Peter Clark, David H. Bodiker Lecture of Criminal Justice: Minority 
Practice, Majority's Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 288 (2012) 
(“Parochialism helps explain . . . why insular communities demand extra punishment, especially 
death, for cross-culture crim.”). 
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stage is when jurors consider whether to impose a death sentence. This latter stage 
has racial implications for multiple reasons: when jurors consider aggravating 
factors, such as whether the defendant committed a murder that was “heinous, 
atrocious and cruel,” the amorphous nature of the inquiry as compared to an 
ordinary question of fact (e.g. did the defendant fire this weapon) increases the 
opportunity for racial bias to operate;
87
 jurors consider mitigating evidence in 
different ways depending on the race of the defendant;
88
 and jurors weigh victim 
impact testimony differently based on the race of the victim.
89
 The third category 
is a structural one, focusing on a core justification for capital punishment—
retribution—and asking whether it is hopelessly intertwined with race.  
1. Spatial and Cultural Explanations 
 
Jurors empanelled in state capital trials are culled from the county in which the 
homicide occurred.
90
 This section explores how the spatial and cultural realities of 
this process influences the types of crime for which the death penalty is sought 
and obtained. The counties that regularly return death sentences tend to possess a 
peculiar geography: a heavily minority populated urban core surrounded by a 
thick ring of heavily White populated suburbs.
91
 The federal jurisdictions that 
return the most death sentences follow a similar pattern: the counties where the 
homicide occurred are often counties where a majority of the population are 
minority group members, but jurors are culled from all of the counties in the 





Political scientists Joe Soss and his colleagues argue that the spatial distribution of 
Black and White Americans in a jurisdiction matters tremendously because 
“individuals with similar characteristics can be expected to respond differently to 
this issue depending on their surrounding social environments.”
93
 Support for the 
                                                 
87
 Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly), in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 7, at 236. 
88
 Id. at 236, 236-40. 
89
 Id. at 236, 240-43. 
90
 G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, supra note 6 at 432 (explaining that the jury lottery system is 
based on county). 
91
 Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, supra note 7. at 272 (offering, for example, “Baltimore 
County, Maryland-the predominantly white, suburban donut that encircles the majority African-
American Baltimore City”).  
92
 G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, supra note 6 at 437 (“[W]hat is striking about these 
jurisdictions is that the county of the offense generally has a high percentage of blacks, but is 
located within federal districts which are heavily white.”). 
93
 Joe Soss, Laura Langbein & Alan R. Metelko, Why Do White Americans Support the Death 
Penalty?,  65 J. OF POLITICS 397, 414 (2003). 
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death penalty fluctuates among White Americans depending on whether they 
possess high or low anti-Black prejudice and on their residential proximity to 
Black Americans.
94
 Explicit racial bias is a strong predictor of death penalty 
support for White Americans generally, but the predictive quality varies 
depending on the racial demographics of a particular location.
95
 White Americans 
with high explicit anti-Black prejudice show increased support for capital 
punishment when moving from an all-White county to a county with at least a 
20% Black population.
96
 Indeed the predicative value of explicit racial prejudice 
and death penalty support “more than double[s]” for White Americans that live in 
“more integrated”—as opposed to all White—counties.
97
 This appears to be (at 
least in part) a function of increased self-reporting of explicit racial bias: among 
Americans residing in counties with a 20%, or greater, Black population, explicit 




Liebman and Clark posit that the handful of jurisdictions that continue to use the 
death penalty with regularity are bound together by their parochial tendencies as 
well as their spatial characteristics.
99
 By parochial, Liebman and Clark mean to 
convey a sense of “localism for its own sake,” or “the attribution of innate 
importance and validity to the values and experiences one shares with the 
members of--and thus to the security, stability and continuity of--one's closely 
proximate community.”
100
 Parochialism also embodies “fears that prized local 
values and experiences are embattled, slipping into the minority and at risk from 
modernity, cosmopolitanism, immigration-driven demographic change, and a 
coterie of ‘progressive’ and secular influences, including permissiveness and 
crime.” Thus, communities with parochial characteristics possess “a sense of 
anxiety or threat” about “outside influences that threaten to dilute or entirely 




High death penalty usage appears to be influenced by both the spatial distribution 
of racial diversity and cultural parochialism. As Liebman and Clark conclude, 




 Id.  
96
 Id.; id. at 416 (“White Americans’ preferences for the death penalty cannot be adequately 
understood apart from their racial component. Racial prejudice is, in the aggregate, a significant 
part of what white death penalty support means. Just as racial bias remains a feature of how capital 
punishment seems to be practiced in the U.S., so too does it continue to distort the ways white 
Americans think about and respond to the ultimate penalty.”). 
97




 James Liebman and Peter Clark, David H. Bodiker Lecture of Criminal Justice: Minority 
Practice, Majority's Burden: The Death Penalty Today, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255 (2012).  
100
 Id. at 268.  
101
 Id. 269-270. 
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 [h]eavy use of the death penalty [ ] seems to occur when the worst 
effects of crime have spilled over from poor and minority 
neighborhoods and are particularly salient to parts of the 
community that we can predict will have greater influence over 




Professors Shatz and Dalton recently conducted studied 473 first-degree murder 
convictions that occurred in Alameda County,
103
 California over 23 years. There 
are two distinct neighborhoods in Alameda County—North County, with a 30% 
Black population and South County, with a less than 30% Black population. 
Blacks were 4.5 more likely to be a homicide victim than Whites in North 
County;
104
 whereas Whites were 3 times more likely to be a homicide victim in 
South County.
105
 Nonetheless, Shatz and Dalton found that “the Alameda County 
District Attorney was substantially more likely to seek death, and capital juries, 
drawn from a county-wide jury pool, were substantially more likely to impose 




Indeed, Liebman and Clark conclude that it is the “cross- boundary, cross-class, 
and cross-race spill-over effect of crime—or the elevated fear of it—that disposes 
communities towards the harshly retributive response of capital punishment.”
107
 
Professor Garland is more blunt: legislators and juries express the moral 
consensus of a community, and when those local decision-makers “identify with 
offenders, or with the groups to which they belong, the death penalty becomes 
less likely.”
108
 Conversely, “[w]herever punishers and punished are deeply 
divided by race or class, death sentences become easier to impose.”
109
 Divisions 
between racial groups living in the locality “foster suspicion and hostility” and the 
more powerful group often uses “moral phrasing” to establish “outsiders as 
immoral, idle, dirty, or dangerous.”
110
 The dynamics could feed race of the victim 
effects by overvaluing the lives of white victims relative to black victims—even 
when black homicide victims are more numerous—and simultaneously 




 Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty With Statistics: Furman, 
McCleskey and a Single County Case Study,  Univ. of San Francisco Law Research Paper No. 










 DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY IN AN AGE OF 




 Id. at 169. 
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intensifying the perceived need for retribution because the offender crossed 
geographic and social boundaries.  
 
Professor Boddie suggests that implicit racial bias might be at play here.
111
 
Labeling the interaction of implicit bias and physical space as a form of “racial 
territoriality,”
112
 she hypothesizes that “buttressed by social and cultural norms of 
racial separation and fear”
113
 implicit biases can be “triggered by spatial 
conditions, including not only whether people of color are present but also their 
status within the space and how they are treated and/or represented.”
114
 In this 
way, neighborhoods like North County and South County in Alameda County, 
California become spaces that “represent more than a physical set of boundaries 
or associations.”
115
 Instead, these “racialized” spaces “correlate with and reinforce 
cultural norms about spatial belonging and power.”
116
  
2. Race and Procedural Discretion: The Role of Prosecutors and Capital Jurors  
 i. Prosecutorial Charging Decisions 
 
Discrimination can enter into capital punishment determinations at the point 
where prosecutors decide to pursue cases capitally.
117
 The typical claim is that 
prosecutors choose to pursue the death penalty more often in cases where the 
victim is White.
118
 There is strong support for this proposition.
119
 For example, 
the East Baton Rouge study discussed above indicated that prosecutors in that 
Parish pursued capital cases 364% more often when the victim was White than 
when the victim was Black.
120
 Baldus similarly found that charging practices 
                                                 
111












 See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287 (“Baldus found that prosecutors sought the death penalty 
in 70% of the cases involving Black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving 
white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving Black defendants and Black 
victims; and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and Black victims.”). 
118
 See Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death supra, note 69 at 106-107 (“Since death penalty 
prosecutions require large allocations of scarce prosecutorial resources, prosecutors must choose a 
small number of cases to receive this expensive treatment. In making these choices they may favor 
homicides that are visible and disturbing to the majority of the community, and these will tend to 
be white-victim homicides.”). 
119
 See Blume et al, supra note 4; Lynch and Haney, supra note 5 at 577 (discussing a recent study 
of death-eligible Maryland homicide cases that found that “prosecutorial discretion accounted for 
much of the race-of-victim effect, but that those biases were not corrected at later stages”).  
120
 Id.  
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significantly contribute to the race of victim in Southwest Arkansas.
121
 But why 
do prosecutors make these choices? One theoretically possible explanation for 
capital charging discrepancies is that crimes with White victims, and particularly 
crimes with Black defendants and White victims, are more aggravated on average 
than Black victim crimes.
122
 Another possibility is that the wishes of the victim’s 
surviving family members are important to the prosecution, and that the average 
family member of a Black victim is less willing to demand—or even applaud—
capital charges because the average Black American is less likely to support the 
death penalty.
123
  Yet another possibility—consistent with our implicit bias-based 
claims—is that prosecutors devalue (perhaps automatically and unintentionally) 
the lives of Black victims relative to White victims.
124
 The prosecutorial 
discretion explanation ties in to the spatial and cultural explanation offered above: 
When White victims (“the insiders”) are killed by Black citizens (“the outsiders”) 
in a jurisdiction where Blacks exist in sufficient numbers to provoke fear and 
anxiety, but are not sufficiently integrated into the economy and culture of the 
locality, then offenses committed by Blacks against Whites can be perceived to be 
more aggravated, White community members can be expected both to be more 
punitive and more likely to wield political power, and the humanity of the White 
victims can be overvalued and the humanity of the Black offender (and Black 
victims) undervalued.  
                                                 
121
 Baldus, et al, note 8, supra at 585 (“These large Black-defendant/white-victim race effects were 
overwhelmingly the product of prosecutorial charging and jury sentencing decisions.”). 
122
 There is mixed data on this question. Compare Glenn L. Pierce & Michael Radelet, Race, 
Region, and Death Sentencing in Illinois, 1988-1997, 81 OR. L. REV. 39, 67 (2002) (noting if 
“homicides with white victims are more aggravated or otherwise more death-eligible than 
homicides with Black victims, [race of the victim disparities] can be explained by legally relevant 
variables,” but finding that race of victim effects in a ten year dataset of Illinois death-eligible 
homicides persist even after controlling for legally relevant factors (including relative aggravation 
of the homicides)); with Blume et al, supra note 4 (noting that Black offender / white victim cases 
involve “stranger crimes” or multiple victim crimes more than do any other combination of 
offender / victim racial groupings, but noting that these categorizations are themselves subject to 
racially tinged decision-making and, in any event, that homicide characteristics do not eliminate 
race of victim effects).  
123
 See, e.g., Baldus & Woodworth, Legitimacy of Capital Punishment, supra note 6 at 1449-50 
(“Support for capital punishment is substantially lower in Black communities than it is in white 
communities. Thus, to the extent that prosecutors take into account the views of the victim's 
family, the request for a capital prosecution is likely to be higher when the victim is white. 
Moreover, because most prosecutors are white, the families of white victims are more likely to 
meet with the prosecutor and press their views on the death penalty.”). 
124
 See, e.g.,id. at 1450 (“[W]e consider it highly plausible that the statistically significant race-of-
victim effects documented in the literature reflect a devaluing (conscious or unconscious) of Black 
murder victims.”); Smith and Cohen, supra, note 7 at 240 (arguing that “white [decision-makers] 
are more likely to magnify the humanity of white victims and marginalize the humanity of Black 
perpetrators, [which] negatively affects defendants who murder white victims, because the 
favorable implicit biases that flow toward white victims enhance the perceived harm of the crime 
when the victim is white.”). 




ii. Capital Jurors 
 
Jury decision-making during the penalty phase of a capital trial is another point in 
the administration of the death penalty where racial disparities can seep into the 
system.
125
 This can happen through at least two different avenues: 1) through the 
use of victim impact evidence and 2) through the inability of jurors to empathize 
with the mitigating evidence presented by Black defendants. We address each in 
turn. Scholars have suggested that race of the victim bias might enter into the trial 
during the introduction of victim impact evidence, which is a type of evidence 
that is introduced in the sentencing phase of a capital trial by a surviving family 
member.
126
 Victim impact evidence frequently includes videos, pictures and 
music that attempt to capture for the jury a glimpse of the life that has been 
lost.
127
 Robert J. Smith and G. Ben Cohen have observed, “White jurors are more 
                                                 
125
 Mona Lynch and Haney, supra note 5at 586 (“Our findings suggest that the problem of racial 
bias in the capital jury setting is not merely the product of individual actors who hold racial 
animus that they employ privately, in isolation from others. Rather, there appear to be important 
group level processes that are also at work, such that the very context of decision making-jury 
deliberations-may activate and exacerbate racial bias under certain conditions.”); id. at 577 
(“Several recent studies have documented racial bias against Black defendants, apart from the 
interactive effect that the race of defendant has with the race of victim. This work suggests that 
race-based discrimination against a capital defendant is especially likely to operate in the juries' 
penalty phase decision making”) (citing William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner & Marla Sandys, 
Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Jurors' Race and Jury 
Racial Composition, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 171, 189-90 (2001)); William J. Bowers, Marla 
Sandys & Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots of Racial 
Bias in Capital Sentencing when the Defendant is Black and the Victim is White, 53 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1497, 1499-1500 (2004). 
126
 Smith and Cohen, supra note 7 at 240 (arguing that process whereby “all things being equal, 
white jurors are more likely to magnify the humanity of white victims and marginalize the 
humanity of Black perpetrators . . . occurs most clearly through the introduction of victim impact 
evidence in capital cases”); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing the Court’s concern that capital juries will understand victim impact statements to 
imply that “defendants whose victims were assets to their community are more deserving of 
punishment than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy” to include a concern that 
“sentencing juries might be moved by victim impact statements to rely on impermissible factors 
such as the race of the victim”).  
127
 See, e.g., Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. 1020, 1021 (2008) (Stevens, J., statement respecting the 
denial of certiorari) (describing the victim impact evidence presented in one of the consolidated 
cases before the Court in Kelly: “The prosecution played a 20-minute video consisting of a 
montage of still photographs and video footage documenting [the victim’s] life from her infancy 
until shortly before she was killed.  The video was narrated by the victim’s mother with soft music 
playing in the background, and it showed scenes of her swimming, horseback riding, and attending 
school and social functions with her family and friends.  The video ended with a view of her grave 
marker and footage of people riding horseback in Alberta, Canada—the ‘kind of heaven’ in which 
her mother said she belonged.”). 
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likely to magnify the humanity of White victims and marginalize the humanity of 
both Black victims and Black perpetrators. . . .  This dynamic [ ] negatively 
affects defendants who murder White victims, because the favorable implicit 
biases that flow toward White victims enhance the perceived harm of the crime 




Juror difficulty in giving adequate mitigating value to evidence introduced by 
Black defendants is a strong candidate for the factor most likely to induce racial 
unevenness in the penalty phase of capital trials. In Woodson v. North 
Carolina,
129
 the United States Supreme Court held that state capital sentencing 
schemes cannot preclude jurors from considering “relevant aspects of the 
[defendant’s] character and record” or any “compassionate or mitigating factors 
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind”
130
 that tend to suggest that 
death is not an appropriate penalty. Mitigation evidence comes in all shapes and 
forms, but brain injuries, significant intellectual deficits, several mental illness 
and “rotten social background” tend to dominate. The introduction of testimony 
that family members and friends love the defendant is also critical mitigation 
evidence in many capital cases. Each of the mitigating factors requires that the 
capital jury empathize with the defendant, not so that the jury can justify the 
terrible conduct in which the defendant has engaged, but so the jury might find 
some redeeming qualities that suggest that the defendant should remain alive.  
 
Scholars suggest that consideration of mitigating evidence produces race of 
defendant effects (or at least aggravates race of victim effects in Black defendant / 
White victim cases) because most capital jurors are White and male. Reporting 
the results of a simulated California capital trial using 400 jury eligible 
participants, Mona Lynch and Craig Haney concluded: 
 
                                                 
128
 Gross & Mauro, supra note 69.  The following refection from Sam Gross and Robert Mauro 
offered in 1984 remains at least partially relevant today: “[I]n a society that remains segregated 
socially if not legally, and in which the great majority of jurors are white, jurors are not likely to 
identify with Black victims or see them as family or friends. This reaction is not an expression of 
racial hostility, it is simply a reflection of an emotional fact of interracial relations in our society.” 
As Gross and Mauro first suggested, and as Smith and Cohen explain, there may well be an 
unintentional yet powerful relationship that has developed, according to which white victims lives 
have become overvalued relative to Black victims’ lives.  We hypothesize that such effects are not 
only due to an identification or empathy disconnect between white jurors or prosecutors and Black 
victims, but also may be explained by specific societal stereotypes that cast Blacks as of lesser 
worth or value than whites.  
129
 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976). 
130
 Id. at 303-04. 
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the racial disparities that we found in sentencing outcomes were 
likely the result of the jurors' inability or unwillingness to 
empathize with a defendant of a different race … [and] [w]hite 
jurors who simply could not or would not cross the "empathic 
divide" to fully appreciate the life struggles of a Black capital 





Interviews with over a thousand jurors that served on real-life capital juries 
confirm this dynamic: “White and Black men typically came to very different 
conclusions about what they perceived to be the Black defendant's 
remorsefulness, dangerousness, and his "cold-bloodedness,” and “Black men 
reported being more empathic toward the defendants in these cases than any other 




 3. Structural Explanations 
 
i. Race and Retribution 
 
The fact that racial bias persists in capital punishment systems, combined with an 
understanding of the close relationship between punitiveness, race and support for 
the death penalty,
133
 has led commentators to question whether race might be 
inextricable from retribution.
134
 The close relationship between race and 
retribution is important because capital defendants periodically challenge use of 
the death penalty as it relates to a particular crime (e.g. child rape) or a particular 
class of offenders (e.g. juveniles). In analyzing those claims, known as Eighth 
Amendment categorical challenges, the Supreme Court considers whether 
imposition of the death penalty satisfies “the [ ] distinct social purposes”
135
 
embodied in the core punishment rationales. The Court finds “capital punishment 
[to be] excessive when . . . it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes 
served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.”
136
 
                                                 
131




 See, e.g., infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text. 
134
 G. Ben Cohen, McCleskey’s Omission:  The Racial Geography of Retribution, OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2012) 
135
 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,  441 (2008). 
136
 Id. 
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While the Court has expressed ambivalence towards the deterrence rationale,
137
 it 
has closely monitored the retributive value of the death penalty.
138
 In recent years, 
and especially in Kennedy v. Louisiana
139
 (the most recent capital case decided 
under this analysis), the Court at once justified the death penalty primarily on 
retributive grounds and acknowledged the vulnerability of doing so: retribution is 
the punishment rationale that “most often can contradict the law's own ends,” and 
“[w]hen the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into brutality, 
transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.”
140
 Thus the 
relationship between race and retribution is important because retribution has 
been cast as an indispensible component to the constitutionality of the death 
penalty
141
 while racial arbitrariness is an impermissible consideration for 
imposing capital punishment;
142
 and yet, it might be that one cannot be 
contemplated without also considering the corresponding impact of the other. 
Moreover, history teaches us that when retribution and race are intertwined, 
concerns about a law’s “sudden descent into brutality”
143
 or its “transgressing [of] 
the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint”
144
 are at their apex. 
Retribution and race have an uneasy relationship when it comes to capital 
punishment. In Gregg, Justice Stewart, evoking the specter of lynchings, affirmed 
the link between race and retribution, asserting that the constitution permits 
retributive goals for capital punishment because “[w]hen organized society is 
unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 
‘deserve, then there are sown the seeds of anarchy—of self-help, vigilante justice, 
                                                 
137
 Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 185-186) (joint opinion of Powell, J, Stewart, J and Stevens, J) 
(underscoring that “no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or refut[es] th[e] view 
[that the death penalty serves as a significantly greater deterrent than lesser penalties]”); see also 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 79 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“The legitimacy of deterrence as 
an acceptable justification for the death penalty is also questionable, at best. Despite 30 years of 
empirical research in the area, there remains no reliable statistical evidence that capital punishment 
in fact deters potential offenders.
 
In the absence of such evidence, deterrence cannot serve as a 
sufficient penological justification for this uniquely severe and irrevocable punishment.”). 
138
 The Court considers the retributive benefit of the death penalty when exercising its 
“independent judgment” as part of every Eighth Amendment capital proportionality case. See, e.g., 
id. at 2665; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“Whether viewed as an attempt to 
express the community's moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the 
victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult. Retribution is not 
proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose culpability or 
blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and immaturity.”). 
139
 554 U.S. 407 
140
 Id. at 420. 
141
 Id. at 441 (explaining that retribution is one of the “two distinct social purposes” of capital 
punishment). 
142
 See id. at 447 (describing the importance of avoiding “arbitrary and capricious application” of 
capital punishment). 
143
 Id. at 420. 
144
 Id. 





 Because most victims of lynching were punished for offenses 
against Whites,
146
 one might have believed that the combination of channeling the 
societal taste for retribution into the formal justice system and heavy anti-
arbitrariness procedural regulation of the administration of capital punishment 
would have interacted to reduce the tendency to punish more those who commit 
crimes against White Americans.  
ii. Death Qualification 
 
A final explanation for the continued existence of racial disparities is that the very 
processes that are suppose to neutralize the system—for example, the so-called 
“death qualification” of jurors—unintentionally exacerbate efforts to eradicate 
unjustified racially disparate outcomes.  
 
Once it is clear that existing constitutional safeguards have failed to protect 
citizens from continued racial bias in the death penalty, it next becomes important 
to consider whether regulations not only fail to eliminate racial bias, but also 
actually may increase it unwittingly.
147
 One particular form of regulation that 
applies solely to capital cases is the process of “death qualification.” To be 
eligible to sit on a capital jury a prospective juror must be willing to consider as a 
possible sentence both life without the possibility of parole and the death 
penalty.
148
 Stated as a prohibition, no juror who automatically would vote to reject 
(or to impose) the death penalty is eligible to sit on a capital jury.
149
 To be clear, 
                                                 
145
 Gregg, supra note 45at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart J., 
concurring)).  
146
 See Cohen, supra note 134 at 67 ”) (quoting John Paul Stevens, On the Death Sentence, in N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS, 8, 14 (reviewing DAVID GARLAND, PECULIAR INSTITUTION:  AMERICA’S DEATH 
PENALTY IN AN AGE OF ABOLITION (2010))) (“Justice John Paul Stevens, after his departure from 
the bench, observed the connection between the death penalty and lynchings:  ‘That the murder of 
black victims is treated as less culpable that the murder of white victims provides a haunting 
reminder of once-prevalent Southern lynchings.’”). 
147
 See Lynch and Craig, supra note 5 at 598 (“Rather than remedying these potential biases, some 
capital trial procedures worsen them. For instance, the well-documented problem of under-
representation of minorities in many jurisdictions' jury pools is exacerbated in capital cases by the 
added impact of disproportionate exclusion of minorities via death qualification. Because both 
minorities and women in most jurisdictions continue to oppose the death penalty at higher rates 
than White men, they are disproportionately excludable, and fewer of them are eligible to sit as 
jurors on capital cases. Obviously, then, White men are disproportionately likely to be death 
qualified, which increases the overall likelihood of "white male dominance effects.”). 
148
 See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 9 (2007) (citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 
(1985)) (emphasizing that a juror can be removed for cause when (s)he is “substantially impaired 
in his or her ability to impose the death penalty under the state-law framework”); Morgan v. 
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (finding that jurors whom will not consider a sentence other than 
death are excludable for cause).   
149
 Id.  
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mere opposition to the death penalty (or to a sentence less than death for those 
convicted of a capital murder) is not enough.
150
 A prospective juror who opposes 
the death penalty, but states that she can follow the law and consider voting to 
impose a death sentence, is eligible to serve on a capital jury.
151
 Jurors are “death-
qualified” pre-trial, often immediately preceding (and, in some jurisdictions, 




Death qualification is freighted with controversy, but consider how a link between 
death qualification and increased racial bias would have an impact on two discrete 
concerns: 1) conviction-proneness and 2) indicia of community consensus.  First, 
studies reveal that death-qualified jurors tend to be more conviction-prone than 
ordinary juries.
153
 Although some scholars have attempted to explain this 
qualitative difference by focusing on concepts such as authoritarianism,
154
 if death 
qualified jurors are more biased than non-death qualified jurors, implicit racial 
bias could help to explain why death-qualified jurors may exacerbate race of 
defendant and race of victim effects compared to a pool of all potential jurors. 
One could expect that these greater levels of bias would be activated and lead to 
disproportionately harsher and skewed evaluations of crime severity, heinousness, 
and cruelty; the race of the defendant, for example, could easily trigger these 
stereotypes.
155
  A more novel, albeit complementary, possibility is that there are 
yet undocumented implicit racial stereotypes specifically relevant to the value of 
the defendant’s and victim’s life in a capital trial.  These would be stereotypes 
directly related to race and the value of life, more specifically, stereotypes that 
White people are valuable and Black people are worthless.  These stereotypes, 
which could be derived from age-old race related stories and cultural 
                                                 
150
 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968) (holding that a “sentence of death cannot be 
carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for 
cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed 
conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction”). 
151
 See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (the precise standard is “whether the juror's 
views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance 
with his instructions and his oath") (internal quotations omitted). 
152
 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
153
 Id. at 170-173 (discussing the results of six such studies).  
154
 See Brooke Butler and Gary Moran, The Impact of Death Qualification, Belief in a Just World, 
Legal Authoritarianism, and Locus of Control on Venirepersons’ Evaluations of Aggravating and 
Mitigating Circumstances in Capital Trials, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 57, 61 (“Specifically, legal 
authoritarians are more likely to feel that the rights of the government outweigh the rights of the 
individual with respect to legal issues. Legal authoritarianism has been found to predict verdicts in 
both capital and non-capital criminal cases.”).  
155
 Charles Ogletree, Robert J. Smith & Johanna Wald, Coloring Punishment: Implicit Social 
Cognition and Criminal Justice, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, 45, 48 (noting that 
“Black citizens are often associated with violence, dangerousness, and crime” and detailing social 
science findings that demonstrate such associations). 
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reinforcement regarding individuality, value, competence, humanness, and worth 
could be particularly harmful in capital trials, especially if death qualified jurors 
possessed heightened levels of this bias.   Activated in a criminal trial, such 
stereotypes, if proven, could potentially affect not only how the sanctity of the 
defendant’s life is perceived, but also how the victim’s life is valued.  
 
Second, commentators have argued that the process of removing from jury 
eligibility any citizen who refuses to impose the death penalty inhibits an accurate 
assessment of modern community standards, which is a required Eighth 
Amendment function of the jury.
156
 Previous research has established that death-
qualified juries tend to be populated by a disproportionate number of White 
citizens.
157
 The fact that non-White citizens are disproportionately excluded from 
jury service in capital cases alone raises obvious questions about the ability to 
read into jury verdicts the imprimatur of community consensus. If our hypothesis 
is correct, though, death-qualified jurors are not only disproportionately White, 
they also possess stronger implicit and explicit racial biases than jury-eligible 
citizens generally, and the reason why capital juries are more implicitly biased is 
because the process results in fewer non-White jurors.
158
 These findings, taken 
together, would substantially undercut the notion that the verdicts of capital juries 
represent the community consensus on the question of capital punishment.  
 
In light of the continued relevance of both the role of race in the administration of 
the death penalty, as well as the dangers of death qualification, we crafted a study 
that sought to provide an early yet detailed look at how race and death penalty 
jurisprudence would be amplified by new empirical findings.  Our study therefore 
attempts to provide greater understanding of the ways in which knowledge of 
                                                 
156
 G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of Death-Qualification, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
87 (2008) (“Measuring the community’s sentiment concerning a specific punishment by gathering 
a venire, removing from the venire all people opposed to a punishment, and then taking the 
temperature of the remaining citizens concerning the propriety of that punishment, would be like 
assessing the impact of global warming by taking the temperature in a room with its air-
conditioning on.”); Lynch and Haney, supra note 5 at 600 (arguing that death-qualification 
“undermin[es] the representativeness of the capital jury and widen[s] the empathic divide because 
‘death qualified juries are less likely to share the racial and status characteristics or the common 
life experiences with capital defendants that would otherwise enable them to bridge the vast 
differences in behavior the trial is designed to highlight.’”) (internal citation omitted).  
157
 Brooke Butler & Adina W. Wasserman, The Role of Death Qualification in Venirepersons’ 
Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 36 J. APP. SOC. PSYCH. 1744, 1745-1746 (2006) (noting 
that “jurors who pass the [Wainwright v.] Witt standard tend to be demographically 
distinguishable: They are more likely to be . . . White . . . .”). 
158
 Brooke Butler has indeed found that death qualified jurors have higher levels of self reported 
racial bias than non-qualified jurors.  See Brooke Butler, Death Qualification and Prejudice: The 
Effect of Implicit Racism, Sexism, and Homophobia on Capital Defendants' Right to Due Process, 
25 BEHAV. SCI. & L., 857 (2007) [hereinafter Butler, Death Qualification and Prejudice].  
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juror bias, particularly implicit racial bias, influences the administration of the 
death penalty.  Specifically, we sought to add to the discourse on the topics of 1) 
whether implicit racial bias helps explain the ineffectiveness of death penalty 
regulation for eliminating racial bias, 2) whether, as a result of implicit bias, race 
and retribution are inextricable in the capital context, and 3) whether death 
penalty procedural regulations might inadvertently aggravate the risk that racial 
biases will seep into the capital punishment process. Section IV provides details 
of the study.  First, however, Section III provides a foundation in implicit bias 
literature, particularly in the criminal law setting, by explaining what is known 
and not yet known about implicit bias in criminal trials generally. This knowledge 
is then applied to the capital context in formulating specific hypotheses for our 
study. 
III.  IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
Considering its compelling methods and powerful findings, the growth of implicit 
bias research in the cognitive sciences has unsurprisingly triggered an increased 
interest of implicit bias in the legal context.
159
  Legal scholars have now at least 
begun considering implicit bias in a broad range of domains across the law.
160
  
                                                 
159
 See generally, IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, 
eds. 2012) (considering how implicit bias functions across fifteen different areas of law).  See also 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, "Science," and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL'Y 
REV. 477, 477 (2007) [hereinafter Bagenstos, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law]; Mark W. 
Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-
Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 149 (2010) (providing a federal judge’s perspective on implicit bias); Jerry Kang, Trojan 
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1497–1539 (2005) (introducing implicit bias research to 
legal scholars generally, and applying it to the communications law and policy context); Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995) (introducing the 
concept of unconscious discrimination to the employment discrimination realm); Linda Hamilton 
Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias 
and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1027 (2006); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) 
(drawing primarily upon Freudian psychology, but his powerful arguments set the stage for 
discussions of implicit social cognition); Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 471, 479 (2008) (discussing implicit bias in the context of sexual orientation bias); Justin D. 
Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 
DUKE L.J. 345, 363 (2007) [hereinafter Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality] (arguing that judged 
and juries remember and misremember case facts in racially biased ways); Justin D. Levinson, 
SuperBias: The Collision of Behavioral Economics and Implicit Social Cognition and, 45 AKRON 
L. REV. 591 (2012) [hereinafter Levinson, SuperBias] (claiming that the behavioral law and 
economics decision model overlooks the role of implicit biases).   
160
 See, e.g., Michele Wilde Anderson & Victoria C. Plaut, Implicit Bias and the Resilience of 
Spatial Colorlines, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW,  supra note 7, at 25 (examining 
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For example, it is now not uncommon to see a scholar arguing that implicit bias 
affects the way courts and the United States government treat Native American 
sovereignty,
161
 the way the IRS makes auditing decisions,
162
 or the way corporate 
boards allocate funds to charities and executives.
163
  In the context of race and 
criminal justice, considerations of implicit bias have begun to appear more 
commonly in discourse.
164
  In light of this rapid development of implicit bias-
focused criminal law scholarship and because racial disparities in the 
administration of the death penalty have been so apparent for decades, it is  
noteworthy that scholars have yet to examine deeply implicit racial bias in the 
context of capital punishment.
165
     
In the past several years, scholars have tested the role of implicit bias in various 
areas of the criminal justice system.
166
  These studies have begun to provide an 
                                                                                                                                     
implicit bias in property and land use law); Danielle Conway, Implicit Racial and Gender Bias in 
Right of Publicity Cases and Intellectual Property Law Generally, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 7, at 179 (focusing on gender, race, and implicit bias in the right of 
publicity);  Michele Goodwin & Dr. Naomi Duke, Cognitive Bias in Medical Decision Making, in 
IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 7, at 95 (looking primarily at health care 
disparities as a manifestation of implicit bias); Jerry Kang, Bits of Bias, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 7, at 132 (focusing on the communications law context); Justin D. 
Levinson, Biased Corporate Decision-Making?, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, 
supra note 7, at 144 (critiquing bias in corporate charitable giving and executive compensation); 
Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director Independence, 2009 ILL. L. REV. 237 
(focusing on a range of cognitive biases, including automatic in-group preference); Antony Page 
& Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2010) (arguing that poll workers rely on implicit bias in interacting with 
voters); Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (And What Can Be Done 
About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (2007); Eric K. Yamamoto & Michele Park Sonen, 
Redress Bias? in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 7, at 244 (critiquing 
reparations discourse for overlooking harms of women of color). 
161
 Susan Serrano & Breann Swann Nu’uhiwa, Implicit Bias Against Native Peoples as 
Sovereigns, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 7 at  209. 
162
 Dorothy A. Brown, Implicit Bias and the Earned Income Tax Credit, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS 
ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 7 at 164. 
163
 Justin D. Levinson, Biased Corporate Decision Making? in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE 
LAW, supra note 7at 144 . 
164
 See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Police Efficiency, 87 IND. L.J. 1143 (2012); L. Song Richardson, 
Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011). 
165
 Some early projects in this area have begun to consider implicit bias in the capital context.  See, 
e.g., Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 8 (finding that capital defense attorneys possess levels of 
implicit racial bias similar to the population); Levinson, Race, Death and the Complicitous Mind, 
supra note 8; Smith & Cohen, supra note 7. 
166
 See Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy, supra note 69; Philip A. Goff et al., Not Yet 
Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 306 (2008); Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 
159; Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias:  Skin Tone, Implicit Racial 
Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307 (2010); Levinson et al., A 
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outline of the potential impact of implicit bias across the criminal law spectrum 
and offer clues as to how implicit bias may manifest in the capital context, 
specifically leading to racial disparities.  In this Section, we rely on recent 
empirical studies to demonstrate how implicit bias may permeate the criminal 
legal process, with a special focus on jury decision-making.
167
  We then apply 
these lessons to the capital context and set forth the hypotheses for our empirical 
study. 
Because jurors are often staked with the heavy burden of determining not just 
guilt or innocence, but also life or death, it is helpful that much of criminal law’s 
empirical implicit bias work has focused on jury decision-making.  In several 
different projects, Justin Levinson, Danielle Young and colleagues have 
attempted to build the early stages of an implicit-bias model of criminal law juror 
decision-making.
168
  Amplifying established research that deconstructs how jurors 
make decisions,
169
 this implicit bias research can be broken down into three 
sequential decision-making categories:  (1) biased evidence evaluation through 
faulty story construction, (2) stereotype-driven representation of the decision 
alternatives by learning potentially corrupted verdict category attributes, (3) and 
the biased classification of jurors’ stereotype-driven stories into the “best-fitting” 
                                                                                                                                     
Social Science Overview, supra note 9; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect 
Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1195, 1197 (2009). 
167
 We do not mean to exclude other areas, such as policing, prosecutorial discretion, judicial 
decisions, and parole decisions, but focus on topics connected to our jury related hypotheses.  For 
more on implicit bias and prosecutorial discretion, see Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The 
Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE L. REV. 
795 (2012).  Although most implicit bias decision-making research has focused on jurors, one 
team of researchers has tested how implicit bias may affect sitting judges.  Jeffrey Rachlinski and 
his colleagues ran race IATs on a population of judges.  Rachlinski et al., supra note 166.   Like 
the rest of the population, these judges displayed implicit racial biases.  The researchers found, 
however, that the judges were perhaps able to protect again these biases from skewing their 
decisions when race was made salient.  When race was primed subliminally, however, the effect of 
implicit bias appeared to be stronger on decision-making. 
168
 See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 159at 364-73; Levinson & Young, supra 
note 166 (first critiquing Pennington and Hastie’s “story model” of decision-making); Levinson et 
al., A Social Science Overview, supra note 9.  
169
 We build mainly on the acclaimed Story Model of decision making.  See Nancy Pennington & 
Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological Research on Juror and Jury Decision 
Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL BULL. 90, 95 (1990); Nancy Pennington & Reid 
Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 
(1991) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, 
Explaining the Evidence:  Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. 
PERSONALITY. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 189–90 (1992) [hereinafter Explaining the Evidence]; See 
also Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision-Making, in INSIDE THE 
JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION-MAKING 192, 200 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) 
[hereinafter The Story Model].  For an earlier detailed implicit bias amplification of the Story 
Model, see Levinson & Young, supra note 166 at 340-45.  





   We use these stages, based upon those made prominent by 
Professors Pennington and Hastie’s Story Model,
171
 to explain the early 
construction of an implicit bias model of biased decision-making; in each of the 
stages, researchers have found that implicit bias has played at least some role in 
facilitating inequality.
172
  In the context of the death penalty, through our 
empirical study we attempt to add new and unique death-focused categories to the 
model.  Each of the existing model steps, however, may already work to explain 
the range of biased outcomes in capital decision-making. 
A. Biased Evaluation of Evidence and Faulty Story Construction 
According to Professors Pennington and Hastie, the first stage of jury decision-
making involves the construction of stories by jurors.  That is, jurors “engage in 
an active, constructive, comprehension process in which evidence is organized, 
elaborated, and interpreted by them during the course of the trial.”
173
  In our 
proposed implicit bias model of decision-making, when jurors evaluate evidence 
and construct stories about what they believe happened, at least two types of 
implicit biases may manifest.  First, jurors may automatically remember and 
misremember case facts in racially biased ways.
174
  And second, jurors may 
evaluate ambiguous evidence in a stereotyped way based on racial or skin tone 
cues.
175
  In a study of juror implicit memory bias, Justin Levinson found that 
mock jurors more accurately remembered aggression-related case facts when 
presented with an aggressive Black actor than when presented with an aggressive 
White actor.
176
  Furthermore, mock jurors sometimes even had false memories for 
facts that had not actually happened when these “facts” were consistent with 
stereotypes of Black men.
177
  In a later study, Levinson and Danielle Young found 
that mock jurors evaluated ambiguous evidence differently based upon whether a 
                                                 
170
 These categories are derived from the three cognitive processing components that explain how 
jurors interpret information.  See Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 169 at 
192.  
171
 See Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model, supra note 169.  The Story Model seeks to explain 
how jurors process information and decide cases. 
172
 Although Pennington and Hastie have not endeavored to examine the role of implicit bias in the 
Story Model, they have recognized that the process of juror evaluation and interpretation of 
evidence includes both conscious and automatic cognitive processes.  Reid Hastie, Conscious and 
Nonconscious Cognitive Processes in Jurors’ Decision, in BETTER THAN CONSCIOUS? DECISION-
MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS 371, 384 (Christoph Engel & 
Wolf Singer eds., 2008). 
173
 Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model, supra note 169 at 523. 
174
 See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 159 at 373-74. 
175
 Each of the bias-driven steps has at least initial empirical support.  See Id. at 407-17.  See also 
Levinson & Young, supra note 166 at 316-18.  
176
 See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 159 at 398-406.  
177
 Id. at 407-10.  
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perpetrator had lighter or darker skin.
178
  When a perpetrator possessed darker 
skin, participants were more likely to interpret ambiguous evidence as indicating 
guilt than when a perpetrator possessed lighter skin.
179
 These studies show that 
juror story construction and evidence evaluation, two key processes of juror 
decision-making, can be tainted by implicit bias.  This type of bias may manifest 
in capital trials, as well.
180
 
B. Stereotype-Driven Decision Alternatives 
Similarly, when jurors enter the next stage of decision-making, learning the 
decision category attributes, research has shown that their decision-making also 
may be infected by implicit bias.  According to Pennington and Hastie, during this 
second stage of juror decision-making, jurors learn about their verdict options, 
such as first degree murder, second degree murder, guilty, not guilty, and so on, 
primarily through judicial instructions.
181
  As jurors learn the relevant categories, 
existing knowledge structures can interfere with their cognitive processes.  For 
example, a study by Levinson, Huajian Cai, and Young found that people 
implicitly associate the racial category of Black with the legal concept of guilty 
and the racial category of White with not guilty.
182
  In that study, the researchers 
devised a “Guilty- Not Guilty IAT” in which participants had to pair the racial 
categories of Black and White (exemplified by photos of Black and White faces) 
with words representing the legal concepts of guilty and not guilty.
183
  Consistent 
with the experimenters’ predictions, participants implicitly associated Black with 
guilty and White with not guilty.
184
   
During this stage of decision-making, jurors in capital trials also learn about and 
begin to consider death as a possible penalty.  Although it has yet to be tested 
empirically, it is possible that even the introduction of the penalty of death as an 
outcome possibility actually primes the racial stereotype of violent and dangerous 
Black males.  Levinson has argued that media, culture, and a history of racial 
disparities in the death penalty have led American citizens to cognitively associate 
                                                 
178
 See Levinson & Young, supra note 166. 
179
 Id. at 337.  These decisions were shown to be related to implicit bias and not self reported 
(explicit) racial attitudes.  Id. at 338.  
180
 Id. at 344 
181
 Pennington & Hastie, The Story Model, supra note 169 at 529. 
182
 Levinson et al., A Social Science Overview, note 9.  
183
 Id. at 201-03.  For an explanation of how the IAT works, see supra note 19. 
184
 Id. at 204. Participants also displayed more traditional race-based stereotyped implicit biases, 
and these biases predicted the way jurors made verdict decisions based upon the perpetrator’s skin 
tone.   
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the death penalty with Black male perpetrators.
185
  If this hypothesis were 
confirmed, simply talking about death as a possible penalty, death qualifying 
jurors, or both, could trigger (or “prime”) these racial stereotypes.  These 
triggered stereotypes of death-worthy Black perpetrators could potentially 
prejudice the ensuring trial.
186
  Thus, implicit bias could not only bias the learning 
of the verdict categories of guilty and not guilty, but also could be triggered or 
heightened simply by a discussion of the death penalty as being a potential trial 
outcome.  
C. Biased Classification of Stories into Verdicts 
In the final stage of Pennington and Hastie’s decision-making model, jurors match 
the stories they construct in the first stage of decision-making into the verdict 
categories they learned about in the second stage.
187
  According to our implicit 
bias theory, this means that jurors classify their already biased stories into the 
most fitting already biased verdict categories.  The risks here are obvious.  Yet 
this stage even creates novel risks of bias.  According to jury researchers, the final 
stage of decision-making is not simply a combination of the first two stages; it 
also involves the incorporation of the presumption of innocence.
188
  Interestingly, 
even this stage, presumed by many to be one of the core protections underlying 
the American criminal trial,
189
 may introduce bias into an already infected 
process.  A study by Young, Levinson, and Scott Sinnett provides preliminary 
evidence that presumption of innocence jury instructions themselves may prime 
jurors in ways consistent with racial stereotypes.
190
  In that study, mock juror 
participants viewed a video containing jury instructions from a federal judge in 
which the judge either gave instructions regarding the presumption of innocence 
and burden of proof, or other (more innocuous, yet of similar length) 
                                                 
185
 Levinson, Race, Death and the Complicitous Mind, supra note 8.  Levinson also argued that 
implicit bias might account for the unintentional masking of race of defendant effects in large 
scale statistical studies.  Id. at 632-33. 
186
 After all, priming racial stereotypes has been shown alter decision-making. Levinson et al., A 
Social Science Overview, supra note 9.  
187
 Id. at 530. 
188
 Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 169 at 191; Pennington & Hastie, 
The Story Model, supra note 169 at 201.    
189
 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).  See also Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 
503 (1976) (“The presumption of innocence . . . is a basic component of a fair trial under our 
system of criminal justice.”).  According to Scott Sundby, “the presumption of innocence is given 
vitality primarily through the requirement that the government prove the defendant’s guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  Scott E. Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 
40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 458 (1989).   
190
 Danielle K. Young et al., Presumption of Innocence:  Biasing Racial Cues (2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors). 




  Jurors were then immediately given a dot-probe task, a 
computerized visual measure used by attention-perception researchers to 
determine where a person is attending/focusing.
192
  The study showed that 
participants who received the presumption of innocence instructions were more 
likely to visually focus on a Black face compared to participants who received the 
other instructions.
193
  Drawing on the literature from perception studies, in which 
studies have shown that the activation of crime causes people to attend to Black 
faces,
194
 and that the priming of Black stereotypes leads to the faster identification 
of weapons,
195
 the researchers interpreted this finding as indicating the 
counterintuitive – that people actually implicitly associate the presumption of 
innocence with Black aggression and guilt.
196
  If it is indeed true that instructing 
jurors on the presumption of innocence could presumably prime implicit 
associations of Black guilt (all added on top of the biases that have already 
occurred in the previous stages), it would serve as a powerful reminder that the 
jury decision-making process could serve as an automatic bias delivery 
mechanism. 
In light of this research on implicit bias in the various stages of criminal trial 
decision-making, one could predict that implicit bias could manifest in capital 
decision-making in similar ways.  Specifically, it could be predicted that jurors 
will implicitly associate Black defendants with racial stereotypes, including 
aggressiveness, guilt, and perhaps even lack of worth.  These same stereotypes 
could apply to victims, too.  Similarly, juries might remember and misremember 
facts from trial in racially biased ways.  These facts, too, could include those 
relevant to both the defendant (e.g. facts relevant to aggravating or mitigating 
factors) and the victim (e.g. facts relevant to their value to their employers, 
families, and communities). Jurors may also automatically evaluate ambiguous 
evidence in an unjust manner, and be primed by various jury instructions.  In the 
study we conducted, we were motivated by related research questions that build 
on these previous studies as well as draw on decades of research on racial 
disparities in the death penalty.   
                                                 
191
 The instructions were based upon the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions, available at 
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/web/sdocuments.nsf/crim (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
192
 Young et al., supra note 190 at 5.   
193
 Young et al., supra note 190 at 9.  
194
 Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black, supra note 9 at 888 (“Indeed, thinking about the concept of 
crime not only brought Black faces to mind but brought stereotypically Black faces to mind.”). 
195
 Id. at 881 (explaining that participants who saw a Black face were more apt at identifying 
“crime-relevant objects”). 
196
 Young et al., supra note 190.  
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The history of racial bias in the death penalty, the still troubling application of 
death qualification, and the emergence of implicit racial bias scholarship and 
methods led us to conduct an empirical study.  Consistent with our discussion in 
the previous sections, we hypothesized as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1:  Jury eligible citizens harbor implicit racial stereotypes that 
may prove relevant to capital cases, including stereotypes specific to the value of 
human life.  Specifically, jurors will associate Black with aggressive, lazy, and 
worthless, and White with virtuous, hard-working, and valuable. 
 Hypothesis 2:  Death qualified jurors will display greater implicit bias and 
self-reported bias than jurors who would be excluded from jury service.  Thus, the 
process of death qualification will remove the least racially biased jurors and lead 
to the empanelling of more biased juries. 
 Hypothesis 3:  Implicit racial bias will predict which defendants are 
sentenced to death; specifically, the more implicit bias jurors display, the more 
likely they will be to sentence a Black defendant to death, and the more likely 
they will be to sentence to death a defendant on trial for killing a White victim. 
IV.  THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
To test these hypotheses, we conducted an empirical study designed to examine 
the role of implicit racial bias in death qualification and in capital decision-
making.  This Section presents the methodology and results of the study. 
A. Methods 
1. Participants.   
The study involved 445 jury eligible citizens in six leading death peanlty states:  
Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Oklahoma, and Texas.
197
  Participants 
were recruited on the Internet by a specialized survey recruitment firm.
198
  The 
                                                 
197
 At least 75 participants from each state initially completed the study, totaling 478 participants.  
This ranged from a minimum of 75 participants in Alabama to a maximum of 82 participants in 
Florida.  Participants who were not United States citizens (N=2), or did not meet other 
qualifications to serve as jurors (e.g., having been convicted of a felony, N=27), or who were not 
from the targeted states (N=4) were removed from the data set.  
198
  These participants were part of a national database maintained by the private survey company; 
they received minimal compensation for participating.  Because the participants had chosen to 
receive survey solicitations from the soliciting company, the participant pool was not a random 
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participant pool was diverse, as indicated by several measures.  The age of the 
participants ranged from 18 to 81, with an average age of 53.39 (SD=14.62) years. 
Of the participants, 57.7 percent were women. Participants in the study came from 
a wide range of ethnic backgrounds.  82.7 percent of participants identified 
themselves as Caucasian, 5 percent of participants identified themselves as 
African-American, 3.4 percent of participants identified themselves as multiracial, 
2.7 percent of participants identified themselves as Latino, 2.5 percent identified 
as Asian, 2.5 percent identified as Native American/Hawaiian, and 1.4 percent 
identified themselves as members of other ethnic groups.
199
 The participant pool 
contained tremendous educational diversity.  For example, 40.6% of the pool had 
completed some college, but did not hold a degree, 20.1% held a bachelor’s 
degree, 10.9% held Masters or other non-PhD advanced degrees, 1.4% held PhDs, 
and 18.6% of the pool completed less than high school or high school with no 
college.  There was also substantial religious diversity in the participant pool 
(with members of over fifteen different religions represented).   
2. Materials.   
Participants completed several measures, including two IATs and a mock trial life 
or death sentencing task.  Participants also completed death qualification 
questions prior to the mock trial, two questionnaire style measures of racial 
attitudes, and demographic questions. The IATs measured implicit racial 
stereotypes, but each had a different focus.  One was a Back-White stereotype 
IAT that has been used regularly in implicit social cognition research.
200
  This 
IAT measures implicit associations between race and traditional stereotypes, such 
as aggression and lazyness.  The other was a new IAT we created for purposes of 
this study, which we called the “Value of Life IAT.”  This IAT required 
participants to group together photos of Black and White people with words 
incidating value/worth (e.g. valuable, worthwhile) and lack of value/worth (e.g. 
worthless, expendable).
201
  The purpose of this IAT was to determine whether 
people hold implicit stereotypes relating to race and human worth.  We developed 
this particular IAT because we believed that racial disparities in the death penalty 
                                                                                                                                     
sample of the entire population.  Nonetheless, as our reported statistics suggest, the diversity of the 
sample was notable.   
199
 These were groups that were not listed on the checklist the survey instrument provided. Some 
of the participants who were in this category separately indicated their ethnic identity on a line 
next to the check mark, including participants who checked one or more of the listed ethnicities in 
addition to marking “other.” The groups identified by those who marked “other” included 
Koreans, Samoans, Vietnamese, North Africans, Portuguese, Puerto Ricans, and others. 
200
 Anthony Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The 
Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1478 (1998). 
201
 The stimuli words used for worth were:  Merit, Worthwhile, Worthy, Value, Valuable.  The 
stimuli words used for worthless were: Drain, Expendable, Worthless, Waste, Valueless. 
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may be at least partially explained by differential values placed on the lives of 
defendants and victims.   
The explicit (self-reported) measures of racial bias consisted of a measure known 
as the Modern Racism Scale (MRS).
202
 The MRS asks participants to rate their 
agreement or disagreement with a series of statements, such as “Discrimination 
against Blacks is no longer a problem in the United States.” 
The mock-trial presented to the participants was inspired by an actual case.  The 
trial facts were presented as follows: 
At 10:00 p.m. on May 22, 2009, Edward Walsh, a 48 year old 
Caucasian man, just finished his shift as assistant manager at 
Walmart. He noticed a Walmart private security employee stop a 
customer as the customer was leaving the store. The security guard 
thought that the customer had shoplifted two disposable cameras.  
 
Walsh proceeded to the location where the security officer had 
stopped the customer. When he saw the customer, he remembered 
ringing up his purchases.  He did not recall him purchasing any 
cameras. A physical struggle ensued between the security officer 
and the customer.   
 
As Walsh attempted to aid the security officer in detaining the 
customer, the customer pulled out a handgun and discharged the 
weapon several times. The customer then fled the scene. Edward 
Walsh died from a gunshot wound to the chest. The customer, who 
was later identified as Tyrone Jones, a 22 year old African-
American man, subsequently turned himself in to the police. 
 
After the description of the crime, participants read the Victim Impact Testimony 
given by the victim’s wife.
203
  During this testimony, the prosecutor questions the 
victim’s wife about the loss of his life.  The following is an excerpt:
204
   
 
Attorney: Where do you stand today? 
 
                                                 
202
 See J.B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale, in 
PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 91 (John F. Davido & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986). 
203
 This was a portion of the actual victim impact statement given at trial. 
204
 Appendix A contains this complete testimony.   
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Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]: Obviously life is not the same. 
It has completely fallen apart, for all the dreams, you know. I was 
probably married longer than possibly some of y 'all in here were 
alive at the time. And, you know, it's your friend, it's your lover, 
it's your confidant and your husband, and that more than 
disappeared one morning, you never get that back. You never get 
that back. 
 
The death qualification questions were presented at the beginning of the 
sentencing mock trial task, and were designed to comport with existing case law 
on death qualification.
205
  Thus participants were asked:   
 
 
(1) If the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Baker206 
intentionally murdered Edward Walsh, would you be able to 
find the defendant guilty even though he would then be eligible 
for the death penalty?      
 
(2) If the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Baker 
intentionally murdered Edward Walsh, you will be responsible 
for deciding his punishment. Would you: a) Automatically vote 
for a life sentence without the possibility of parole, b) 
Automatically vote for the death penalty,  c) Be able to consider 
both a life sentence without the possibility of parole and a 
sentence of death. 
 
If participants answered that they were unwilling to convict the defendant (N= 27) 
or if participants answered that they would be unwilling to consider giving a 
convicted defendant the death penalty (N= 51), those participants completed the 
remainder of the study, and their data was retained in order to compare how death 
qualified jurors compare with non death qualified jurors.
207
   
 
                                                 
205
 The death qualification questions were presented at the beginning of the sentencing mock trial 
task, and were designed to comport with existing case law on death qualification. See Wainwright 
v. Witt, supra note 151. 
206
 There were two conditions based on the race of the defendant and two conditions based on the 
race of the victim, known as a 2 * 2 study design.  
207
 Participants who answered that they would automatically vote for the death penalty (N= 53) 
were similarly not treated as death qualified and were removed from statistical analyses of death 
qualified only jurors. 
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The tasks described above were all completed on computers of the participants’ 
choice and were presented in the following manner.  Participants first responded 
to death qualification questions, after which they read a written description of the 
case. The case summation was followed by an evidence slideshow consisting of 
four photographs shown for four seconds each. One of these photos was a 
tombstone that displayed the name of the victim; the name could be altered 
depending upon the race of victim condition.
208
 After viewing this slideshow, 
participants were informed that the defendant had been found guilty, and that their 
job was to decide if the defendant should be sentenced to either death or life in 
prison. They read that “One important factor to take into consideration is the 
impact that the crime had on the family members of [the victim],” and then were 
presented with the Victim Impact Testimony. After reading the testimony, 
participants decided how the defendant should be punished. Next, participants 
completed counterbalanced implicit and explicit measures of bias, with the order 
of the IATs also counterbalanced. Demographic questions were completed last. 
 
B. Results- Implicit Bias and the Death Penalty 
 
To test our hypotheses, and to analyze the results more generally, we conducted 
several statistical analyses:  For hypothesis one, we tested whether death qualified 
jurors harbor significant implicit biases using one-sample t-tests.
209
 Hypothesis 
two was tested using a multivariate ANOVA (MANOVA)
210
 comparing death 
qualified jurors and non-death qualified jurors on the three bias measures (two 
implicit and one explicit). To test hypothesis three, dichotomous death penalty 
decisions (life in prison v. death sentence) were regressed upon race of defendant 
and victim, explicit and implicit biases, and the two-way interactions between 
these variables.
211
   
1. White Jurors More Racially Biased Than Non-White Jurors 
                                                 
208
 These slides are attached as Appendix B. 
209
 A one-sample t-test tests whether or not a single population differs from a hypothesized value. 
In the case of the IAT, the hypothesize value is zero, or no bias. Thus, the one-sample t-test 
referenced here tested whether or not the study population’s IAT score was significantly different 
than zero. RONALD CHRISTENSEN, ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE, DESIGN AND REGRESSION– APPLIED 
STATISTICAL METHODS (2000). 
210
 MANOVA is a special case of ANOVA that allows the testing of several dependent variables 
while reducing Type 1 error, or the probability of finding a significant difference between groups 
when there is not a true difference. BARBARA G. TABACHNICK ET AL., USING MULTIVARIATE 
STATISTICS (2001). 
211
 The regression controlled for race and gender of the participant. 
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White jurors displayed higher levels of implicit racial bias (M=.48) than non-
White jurors (M=.34), as measured by both the stereotype IAT (F(1,311)=15.11, 
p<.001, ηρ²=.05), and the Value of Life IAT (White juror M= .38; non-White 
juror M= .15), (F(1,311)=4.50, p=.035, ηρ²=.01). White jurors also displayed 
higher levels of explicit racial bias (M=2.49), as measured by the Modern Racism 
Scale, than non-White jurors (M=2.04; F(1,311)=12.97, p<.001, ηρ²=.04).
212
   
2. Male and Female Jurors Similarly Biased  
Male jurors displayed marginally higher levels of explicit racial bias (M=2.51), as 
measured by the Modern Racism Scale, than female jurors (M=2.36; 
F(1,311)=2.91, p=.09, ηρ²=.01).
213
  Male jurors did not display significantly 
higher levels of implicit racial bias (M=.49) or higher levels on the Value of Life 
IAT (M=.34) than female jurors (M=.44; M=.36, all ps>.05 ). 
3. Male Jurors More Likely to Sentence to Death 
30.9 percent (N=137) of the participants voted to sentence the defendant to death. 
Male jurors (38.3%) were significantly more likely to vote for death than female 
jurors (25.4%) (χ
2
=8.46, p=.004), a result that was true for all jurors as well as 
death-qualified jurors only (Male= 34.1%, Female=24.0%, χ
2
=3.84, p=.05). 
Although the percentages trend in that direction, White participants were not 




4. Women and Non-White Jurors Less Likely to be Death Qualified214 
Female jurors were significantly more likely to be excluded for failing to be death 
qualified.  24% percent of female jurors indicated that they would be unwilling to 
sentence a defendant to death, compared to 14.3% of male jurors ( χ
2
=5.85, 
p=.02).  White participants were significantly more likely to be death qualified 
(83.2%) than non-White participants (64.3%; χ
2
=12.82, p<.001).  These results 
indicate that death qualification leads to more male and White juries. 
5. Death Qualified Jurors Possess Moderate to Strong Implicit Racial 
Biases 
                                                 
212
 We ran a MANOVA on all of the bias DVs, multivariate significance is:  F(3,309)=7.86, 
p<.001, ηρ²=.07. The results presented are for death qualified jurors. 
213
 A MANOVA on all of the bias DVs failed to reach multivariate significance. We report the 
results here to demonstrate the trends in the data: F (3,309)=1.89, p>.05, ηρ²=.08.  The results 
reported are for death qualified jurors. 
214
 Due to our limited sample size, we combine jurors who would be excluded because they either 
could not vote to convict (traditionally called “nullifiers”) and could not vote for death 
(traditionally called “Witherspoon Excludables).   




Death qualified jurors displayed moderate to strong implicit biases both on the 
racial stereotype IAT, M=.46, t(312)=19.75, p<.001, and the Value of Life IAT, 
M=.35, t(312)=16.02, p<.001, such that they implicitly associated White with 
positive stereotypes and Black with negative stereotypes and implicitly associated 
White with worth and Black with worthless.
215
  
6. Death Qualified Jurors held Greater Self-Reported (Explicit) Racial 
Bias 
 
Jurors who were death qualified displayed higher levels of racial bias (M=2.42) 
on the MRS than jurors who would be excluded because they may be unwilling to 




7. Death Qualified Jurors Held Greater Implicit Racial Bias 
 
Jurors who were death qualified displayed higher levels of implicit racial bias 
(M=.46), as measured by the stereotype IAT, than jurors who would be excluded 
because they may be unwilling to convict or unwilling to sentence a defendant to 
death (M=.36, F(1,390)=3.87, p=.05, ηρ²=.01).  Similarly, jurors who were death 
qualified displayed higher levels of bias related to implicit racial worth (M=.34), 
as measured by the Value of Life IAT, than non-death qualified jurors (M=.25, 
F(1,390)=4.46, p=.035, ηρ²=.01).   
8. Death Qualification Implicit and Explicit Bias Differential Driven By 
Exclusion of Non-White Jurors 
 
We next investigated whether the exclusion of non-White individuals contributes 
to the higher levels of racial bias (on the Value of Life IAT, Stereotype IAT, and 
MRS) in death qualified juries. To test this, three separate mediation models were 
run on each of the three measures of bias using the zMediation method.
217
  The 
mediation results for the Value of Life IAT suggest that the race of a juror fully 
mediates the relationship between death qualification and implicit worth.
218
  This 
                                                 
215
 These two measures were moderately positively correlated, r(313)=.46, p<.001. 
216
 We conducted a MANOVA on all of the bias DVs: F(4,387)=4.14, p=.003, ηρ²=.04. 
217
 Dawn Iacobucci, Mediation Analysis and Categorical Variables:  The Final Frontier, 22 J. 
CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 582 (2012).   
218
 The direct effect of death qualification on value of life bias was, as in previous analyses, 
significant, B = .10, p = .04.  As expected, the relationship between death qualification and race of 
the individual (White/Not-White) was significant, B = -1.01, SE=.29, p < .001, as was the 
relationship between race of the individual and value of life bias, B = .22, SE=.05, p < .001. 
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suggests that the difference between White and non-White jurors’ implicit value 
of life bias completely mediates the differences between death qualified jurors 
and non-death qualified jurors, zMediation = -2.69, p<.05.  Similarly, the 
mediation results for implicit bias as measured by the stereotype IAT mirror those 
of the value of life IAT.
219
  The difference between White and non-White jurors’ 
implicit stereotype bias completely mediates the differences between death 
qualified jurors and non-death qualified jurors, zMediation = -2.12, p<.05.  
Finally, the mediation results for the explicit racism, as measured by the MRS, 
suggest that the race of a juror partially mediates the relationship between death 
qualification and explicit racism.
220
  This suggests that the difference between 
White and non-White jurors’ explicit bias partially mediates the differences 
between death qualified jurors and those who would not consider the death 
penalty, zMediation = -2.60,  p<.05. 
[Insert Table 1 Here: Implicit Racial Bias and Probability of Death Based on Race 
of Defendant] 
9. No Main Effects for Race of Defendant or Race of Victim  
 
Although studies on actual court decisions have revealed consistent effects across 
jurisdictions over the past thirty years, particularly on race of the victim, the 
results of our study did not reach statistical significance in this regard.  Neither 
race of the defendant (β=.20, p=.62), race of the victim (β=.26, p=.67), nor their 
interaction (β=-.59, p=.55), predicted increased probability of giving a death 
sentence (See Table 3).  
 
[Insert Table 2 Here: Self Reported Bias and Probability of Death based on Race 
of Victim]  
10. Racial Bias, Implicit and Explicit, Predicts Death Verdicts 
 
                                                                                                                                     
Including race of the individual in the model reduced the effect of death qualification to non-
significance, B = .06, SE=.05, p = .18. 
219
 The direct effect of death qualification on stereotype bias was significant, B = .1, p = .05.  The 
the relationship between death qualification and race of the individual (White/Not-White) was 
significant, B = -1.01, SE=.29, p < .001, as was the relationship between race of the individual and 
stereotype bias, B = .15, SE=.05, p = .006. Including race of the individual in the model reduced 
the effect of death qualification to non-significance, B = .08, SE=.05, p = .15. 
220
 The direct effect of death qualification on explicit racism was significant, B = .39, p < .001.  
The relationship between death qualification and race of the individual (White/Not-White) was 
significant, B = -1.01, SE=.29, p < .001, as was the relationship between race of the individual and 
explicit bias, B = .43, SE=.11, p < .001. Including race of the individual in the model does not 
reduce the effect of death qualification to non-significance, B = .31, SE=.10, p = .002. 
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Logistic regression analysis on the life/death decision partially supported our 
hypothesis that biases would interact with race of the defendant and victim to 
increase the likelihood that the jurors would support the death penalty for a 
convicted defendant  (See Tables 1 & 2).  Specifically, interaction effects 
involving racial bias measures and the race of either the defendant or the victim 
significantly increased the odds of a death penalty outcome.  Having a higher 
“value of life” implicit association between White and worth and Black and 
worthless increased the probability of sentencing a defendant to death when the 
defendant was Black (β=-1.77, p=.03).  Interestingly, the “value of life” IAT did 
not interact with the race of the victim, nor did the stereotype IAT significantly 
increase the odds of a death penalty decision (all ps >.05).  
 
The explicit measure of racial bias interacted with the race of the victim. 
Specifically, the MRS interacted with the race of the victim, such that a higher 
self-reported racial bias score led to an increased chance of giving the death 
penalty when the victim of the murder was White ((β=.75, p=.05). The MRS did 
not interact with the race of the defendant.  
 
[Insert Table 3 Here: Regression Results] 
 
V.  SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The study we conducted helps to build a model of implicit bias in the law, 
provides corroborating evidence for spatial and cultural understandings of death 
penalty usage, supports critiques of both procedural and substantive safeguards 
that supposedly add fairness to the capital process, and raises questions with 
implications for a broad range of issues relating to the constitutionality of capital 
punishment. We address each of the contributions in turn.   
 
A. Building an Implicit Bias Model of Criminal Law 
 
The expansion of knowledge of implicit bias in the law is significant; only a 
handful of studies have empirically examined how implicit bias functions in legal 
processes. The findings of the study raise several implications for building a 
broader understanding of implicit bias in criminal law and beyond.  Several of our 
specific findings contribute to this literature.  First, as expected, the study 
confirmed that jury eligible citizens display moderate to strong implicit racial 
stereotypes of Black Americans.  Because these particular implicit stereotypes, 
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such as aggression and laziness, have been shown to predict a wide range of 
decisions and behaviors,
221
 this alone raises concerns regarding the role of racial 
bias, not only in life and death decisions, but also in all criminal proceedings.  
Other results heighten the concerns.  Specifically, in addition to the traditional 
measure of stereotype biases that we used, we also found that jury eligible citizens 
held specific biases related to race and the value of life.  The idea that jury 
eligible citizens specifically associate Black with worthless and White with value 
is both unsurprising (considering death penalty statistics, economic and job 
figures, etc.) and yet hard to fathom (because of the deep moral implications).  
This result suggests that people not only still hold age-old stereotypes of Black 
Americans, such as aggression and laziness, but that they normatively and 
implicitly value them as humans less than their White American counterparts.
222
  
This finding is concerning in all areas of the law, with all types of remedies (in 
tort and contract, for example) and sentencing (in criminal law) potentially 
implicated, but is particularly heightened because human life is actually at stake 
in capital trials. 
 
Unfortunately, as our study showed, the strength of these implicit biases was 
actually heightened by the exclusion of less biased Americans in the death 
qualification process.  Specifically, a process designed to ensure fairness in the 
implementation of the law was found to create a situation in which the chances of 
injustice became magnified.  But what kind of injustice?  Our results show that, 
indeed, implicit bias has the potential to implicate race-based decision-making.  
Because of our finding that increased implicit bias predicted a higher likelihood of 
death decisions for Black defendants, we are left to wonder about all the other 
domains in which it too may be active.  One mild surprise in our results, however, 
was that explicit bias matters, too.  Even though the days of rampant and overt 
racism are gone, our study shows that it is still valuable to monitor explicit racial 
bias, at least in capital cases.  If higher self-reported bias indeed leads, as we 
found, to more death sentences for the killers of White victims, then it seems 
natural that courts would place energy in rooting out those jurors who will 
acknowledge their own biases.  It is unclear, however, whether existing 
questioning efforts in most trials succeed in this regard (and it is similarly unclear 
whether jurors in real trials will admit these biases as readily to judges, as they did 
in an anonymous questionnaire). 
 
B. Spatial and Cultural Explanations of Death Penalty Usage   
 
                                                 
221
 See, e.g., Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 11.  
222
 See generally Goff et al, Not Yet Human, supra note 166.  
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The spatial and cultural “explanation” is largely a sociological description of the 
places where death sentences are still imposed with regularity. Recall that these 
jurisdictions tend to have unique spatial (relatively high Black populations in a 
central zone, surrounded by bands of predominately White areas) and cultural 
(tend to be parochial, with anxiety towards outsiders and hostility to cultural 
change) attributes. Implicit racial bias helps to explain the psychological 
dynamics that undergird the sociological phenomenon. For example, previous 
research on implicit associations between “Black” and “dangerousness”, as well 
as research showing the exposure to a Black face causes a disproportionate 
response in the area of the brain associated with fear,
223
 would suggest that 
residential isolation between Blacks and Whites bolsters the intensity of the 
anxiety towards outsiders. 
 
Our finding that death-qualified participants more rapidly associate White 
subjects with the concept of “worth” or “value” and Black subjects with the 
concepts “worthless” or “expendable” suggests that another form of implicit racial 
bias—implicit in-group favoritism—is at play in “donut” jurisdictions that 
regularly impose death sentences. One of the social groups for which people show 
the strongest and most consistent preferences is the racial in-group. In the United 
States, of the nearly two million Americans that have completed an IAT, roughly 
75-80% of White and Asian (and about 50% of Black Americans) implicitly favor 
White Americans. In donut jurisdictions, the outer ring occupied 
disproportionately by White residents tends to be more affluent. Prosecutors and 
capital jurors alike tend to be White, and, in donut jurisdictions, probably tend to 
live in the outer ring. In other words, in many Black-defendant, White-victim 
cases, the decision-makers are “insiders”, the White victim is an “insider” and the 
Black defendant is an “outsider.” Of the factors that create insider / outsider 
boundaries—spatial segregation and affluence, for example—race is the most 
salient. The fact that participants, who were predominately White, associated 
White with “worth” and “value” suggests that White insiders implicitly associate 
the loss of a White citizen with more harm or loss than the death of a Black 
citizen. True, these same dynamics could exist even in spatially and culturally 
integrated communities, but the spatial segregation and outsider anxiety 
associated with donut jurisdictions facilitates and intensifies the problem.  
 
C. Discretion Points: Prosecutors and Capital Jurors 
 
                                                 
223
 Matthew D Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-related Amygdala Activity in 
African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 720 
(2005), available at http://www.scn.ucla.edu/pdf/nature%20neuroscience%20press/nn1465.pdf. 
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Our results suggest that it is plausible that prosecutors magnify the damage done 
to white victims while paying too little attention to the redeeming quality of black 
offenders. Capital jurors are susceptible to the same dynamics. Although we did 
not find a race of defendant main effect, the white / worth and black / expendable 
findings have haunting implications for the penalty phase of capital trials.  The 
defendant is humanized during the penalty phase. Jurors hear about the 
defendant’s background and his character. In many cases, the defendant suffers 
from mental deficiencies or severe mental illness or has suffered extreme physical 
abuse. If jurors—who mostly are white—are faster to associate value or worth 
with a white defendant than a black defendant—then the race of the defendant 
effects during the penalty phase might be attributable to an unintentional decrease 
in receptivity to mitigation evidence proffered by a Black defendant. 
 
D. Racially Partial Impact of Mechanisms Designed to Reduce 
Impartiality 
 
1. Value of Life and the Core Justifications for Capital Punishment 
 
Our findings challenge the idea that retribution—the core justification for capital 
punishment—is race-neutral. Instead, taken together, three of our findings suggest 
that the retributive rationale could be inextricably tied to race. First, we found that 
death-qualified jurors implicitly valued White lives over Black lives by more 
rapidly associating White subjects with the concepts of “worth” or “value” and 
Black subjects with the concepts of “worthless” or “expendable.” This finding 
could potentially help to explain why real capital juries impose death sentences 
more regularly for White victims: at least at an implicit level we value White lives 
more than Black lives, and thus, perhaps, we seek to punish those individuals who 
have destroyed those whom we value most.
224
 Next, our finding that explicit 
racial bias predicts life and death decisions based on the race of the victim also 
offers support for the idea that we demand more retribution when the life of a 
White person is lost.  Finally, our findings also demonstrate that a higher value of 
life implicit association between White and worth and Black and worthless 
increased the probability of sentencing a defendant to death when the defendant 
was Black. This finding might suggest that jurors who are predisposed to seeing 
Black Americans as comparatively worthless have an easier time retaliating by 
voting to take the life of a Black offender whom himself has taken a life. 
Considered together, our findings strengthen the notion that the relationship 
between race and retribution continues to contribute to the same disparities in 
                                                 
224
 Future research would be needed in this regard, as our regression did not significantly link this 
score to race of victim effects. 
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capital punishment that it did in the context of extra-legal lynching. Importantly, 
our findings suggest that the race-retribution link is not simply historically 
inextricable, but might also be culturally programmed into minds of those citizens 




Although the operation of implicit racial bias in the criminal justice system 
generally has been considered fairly extensively, comparatively little empirical 
evidence evaluates the role that implicit bias plays in capital sentencing. A more 
technical aim in this study, then, was to gather more information about the 
location and manner in which racial bias enters into capital cases. Our findings 
that the death qualification process results in jurors that are more implicitly and 
explicitly racially biased suggest that jury selection is a location where racial bias 
operates.  
Scholars’ first major critique of death qualification was that death-qualified juries 
tend to be more conviction-prone than ordinary juries.  In other words, those 
citizens that refuse to consider voting to impose a death sentence are the same 
jurors that are more likely on the margins to vote not guilty during the guilty / 
innocence phase of the trial. By 1986, when the Supreme Court heard arguments 
in Lockhart v. McCree
225
 on whether “the Constitution prohibit[s] the removal … 
of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty is so strong that it 
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as 
jurors[,]”
226
 a variety of empirical studies provided support for the contention that 
death qualified juries are comparatively more conviction prone than ordinary 
juries.
227
 The defendant relied upon these studies to argue that a conviction-prone 
                                                 
225
 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986). 
226
 Id. at 165. 
227
 See id. at 169-170 (noting the existence of fifteen studies, of which the Court found six to be 
relevant); see, e.g., Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson, & Phoebe C, Ellsworth, The Effects 
of Death Qualification on Jurors' Pre-disposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 
Law & Hum. Behav. 53 (1984) (finding that death-qualified jurors are more likely to vote guilty 
both on initial ballots and after one hour of twelve-person jury deliberations). Social science 
scholars have continued to document that death qualification leads to conviction-prone juries, and 
have done so while addressing the specific deficits that the Supreme Court found in the original 
studies. See Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled Executioner: Capital Juries' Bias and the Benefits 
of True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769, 784-785 (2006) quoting Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, 
Juror's Stories of Death: How America's Death Penalty Invests in Inequality, University of 
Michigan Press, pp. 24-25 (2004) (using data collected from 1201 real capital jurors from more 
than 350 trials and concluding that death-qualified jurors are “disproportionately punitive 
orientations toward crime and criminal justice, are more likely to be conviction-prone. . . .”); id. at 
784 (noting that the findings of the Capital Jury Project eliminate any “nullifier effect” by using 
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jury is a partial jury and that the Sixth Amendment prohibits partial juries.
228
 
Responding to this argument, the Lockhart Court spent little energy in reviewing 
the studies themselves, instead avoiding the experiments’ thoughtful methods and 
important findings by seeking to dismiss their validity.
229
  One notable dismissal 
of all of these studies’ external validity was the Court’s claim that the research did 





Nonetheless, the Supreme Court assumed for the sake of argument that the 
“studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to establish that ‘death 
qualification’ in fact produces juries somewhat more ‘conviction-prone’ than 
‘non-death-qualified’ juries,” and held that the Constitution still would “not 
prohibit the States from ‘death qualifying’ juries in capital cases.”
231
 The Court 
reasoned that jurors that are excluded due to death qualification are not a “distinct 
group” in the same way that “Blacks” or “women” are distinct groups.
232
 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the jurors excluded by death qualification are 
not historically disadvantaged (unlike the groups, e.g. Black Americans, that are 
traditionally covered under the Sixth Amendment’s Fair Cross Section 
requirement).
233
  Instead, they are eliminated based on chosen conscious 
choices—an unwillingness to follow the law by considering a possible death 
sentence. 
 
We found that the process of death qualification results in capital jurors with 
significantly stronger implicit racial biases—on both the stereotype and value of 
life IAT—and explicit racial biases than jury-eligible citizens generally. We also 
found that stronger implicit biases scores predict the likelihood that death-
                                                                                                                                     
actual jurors who survived the process of death qualification and thus by definition are not 
nullifiers). 
228
 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 165. 
229
 Id. at 186 (“[T]he Court was unable to conclude that ‘the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital 
punishment results in an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the 
risk of conviction.’”) (quoting Witherspoon v. State of Ill., 391 U.S. 510, 518). 
230
 Id. at 171-173. Interestingly, a range of studies have continued to emerge post-Lockhart that 
build on the research showing that death qualified jurors are quite different from non-death 
qualified jurors.  See Butler, Death Qualification and Prejudice, supra note 158 at 857 (finding 
that death-qualified jurors display higher levels of explicit racism, sexism (modern sexism scale) 
and racism (modern racism scale)); Brooke Butler and Adina Wasserman, supra note 157 at 1745-
46.  
231
 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, , 173 (1986). 
232
 Id. at 175-176. 
233
 Id. at 162-63 (“[T]he essence of a fair-cross-section claim is the systematic exclusion of a 
‘distinctive group’ in the community such as blacks, women, and Mexican-Americans-for reasons 
completely unrelated to the ability of members of the group to serve as jurors in a particular 
case.’”). 
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qualified jurors vote to impose a death sentence when the defendant is Black, and 
that explicit bias scores predict the likelihood that death-qualified jurors vote to 
impose a death sentence when the victim is White. These findings themselves are 
a significant indictment of the death-qualification process. The biggest 
indictment, however, is our finding that death qualified juries possess stronger 
implicit biases because the process results in the disproportionate elimination of 
non-White jurors. 
These findings, then, not only shine light on where in the capital punishment 
structure racial bias might operate, but also suggest a deeper structural concern: 
the procedures that regulate capital punishment might inadvertently increase the 
risk that racial arbitrariness will infect capital proceedings. A number of studies 
document that implicit racial biases already operate to the detriment of Black 
defendants by: undermining the presumption of innocence, affecting the 
evaluation of ambiguous evidence of guilt, and triggering stereotypes of the guilty 
Black male.
234
 The fact that death-qualified jurors possess greater implicit biases 
might be one reason why death-qualified juries are conviction-prone in cases 
involving Black defendants (and especially in cases with White victims and Black 
defendants). Thus, our findings that death-qualified jurors are more implicitly 
biased, that these implicit racial biases could drive death-proneness, and that the 
increased implicit racial bias on death-qualified juries is explained by the 
exclusion of minority group jurors cast considerable doubt on a core rationale that 
undergirds the Lockhart decision. The Fair Cross Section requirement is primarily 
motivated out of a concern for jury legitimacy.
235
 The Lockhart Court’s point that 
jurors who are excluded due to death qualification are not a “distinct group” in the 
same way that “Blacks” are distinct group loses much of its power in the face of 
these findings that suggest that the Court substantially underestimated the racial 
influence that death qualification has on the cross section of citizens that hear and 
decide capital cases.  
Finally, our findings also lend credence to the notion that death qualification 
impedes accurate assessment of community standards.
236
 The Eighth 
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause draws meaning from “the 
                                                 
234
 Id. at 169-70. 
235
 Id. at 184 (“But  the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of 
the community is impartial . . . .”). 
236
 See, e.g., G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of Death-Qualification, 59 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 87 (2008) (“Measuring the community’s sentiment concerning a specific punishment 
by gathering a venire, removing from the venire all people opposed to a punishment, and then 
taking the temperature of the remaining citizens concerning the propriety of that punishment, 
would be like assessing the impact of global warming by taking the temperature in a room with its 
air-conditioning on.”).  
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evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”
237
 In 
order to assess whether modern decency prohibits a particular sentencing practice, 
courts look to several “objective indicia,” including the behavior of juries.
238
 The 
idea is that juries, as Justice Scalia has put it, “maintain a link between 
contemporary community values and the penal system that this Court cannot 
claim for itself.”
239
 Eliminating jurors that refuse to impose a particular 
punishment practice (here, the death penalty), then, has the effect of eliminating 
the voice of a discrete segment of the community, and thus, making it impossible 
to get a true read on community consensus. Our findings that death-qualified 
jurors possess greater implicit racial biases than jury-eligible citizens generally—
especially when considered alongside our findings that implicit racial bias 
predicts race of defendant effects and explicit racial bias predicts race of victim 
effects—suggests that, for Eighth Amendment purposes, assessing “community 
consensus” based on the jury verdicts of a more biased pool of Americans (i.e. 
death-qualified jurors) might not be a methodology particularly prone to accuracy. 
This broken thermometer for gauging community consensus is even more 
troubling when one considers that the disproportionate exclusion of non-White 
jurors explains the difference in implicit bias score between death-qualified jurors 
and those jury-eligible citizens that cannot survive death-qualification. Stated 
broadly, our findings both hint at where in the capital case racial biases might 
seep into the system and suggest that regulating—as opposed to eliminating—the 
death penalty through mechanisms like death-qualification might have had the 
unintended effect of contributing to rather than detracting from racial 
arbitrariness.  
E. Global Challenges to the Constitutionality of the Death Penalty  
 
In Gregg, the Court espoused the belief that a combination of carefully drafted 
statutes and well-crafted procedural mechanisms would reduce the Furman 
arbitrariness (including racial discrimination) concerns.
240
 In McCleskey, the 
Court had—and exercised—the option of ducking the reality that these new 
statutes and all of the extensive regulations were not, in fact, reducing the risk of 
racial discrimination to a constitutionally tolerable level. If the source of the racial 
bias in the death penalty is not just conscious (and perhaps capable of eradication 
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 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).  
238
 See Gregg v Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (“The jury also is a significant and reliable objective 
index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.”). 
239
 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
240
 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (“[T]he concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be 
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures 
that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance.”). 
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through rigid procedural regulations), but is implicit, then the Court should 
address head-on whether there is a constitutionally intolerable risk of arbitrariness 
when states inflict the death penalty despite evidence that racialized sentencing is 
built-in to the capital punishment regulatory structure via the implicit biases that 
operate in the minds of death-qualified jurors. In other words, if, as we found, 
death-qualified jurors implicitly believe that White Americans possess higher 
worth than Black Americans, then the McCleskey Court focused on the wrong 
question when considering evidence of intentional bias; the real question was 
whether the Court had fallen short on its promise in Gregg:  that new and 
improved procedural regulation would suffice to eliminate arbitrariness.
241
 If the 
seeds of that arbitrariness live literally within death-qualified jurors, and if we 
continue to see race of victim or defendant effects when researchers study state 
and local death sentencing, then, perhaps, Justice Blackmun was correct in his 
assessment that no amount of “tinker[ing] with the machinery of death” could 
create a fair, rational, race-neutral death sentencing scheme.
242
    
 
Our findings also question the wisdom and validity of particular assumptions that 
the Supreme Court has made in effecting constitutional regulation of capital 
punishment. The McCleskey Court took the findings of the Baldus studies at face 
value, but nonetheless found that proof of racial bias in the form of a large-scale 
statistical study does not suffice to prove racial bias in a particular capital case. 
The finding that death-qualified juries implicitly value White Americans over 
Black Americans provides a potential pathway to explaining how the statistical 
studies that show race of the victim effects in a county (or a state) could stem, at 
least in part, from broad swaths of the population (and especially death-qualified 
jurors). Thus, implicit racial bias evidence contributes to the broader literature on 
race and the death penalty both by diversifying the type of evidence that 
documents the influence of race on death sentencing and because implicit bias 
evidence is not as easily subjected to the argument that one cannot deduce racial 
discrimination from racial disparities (the primary complaint lobbied at the Baldus 
study), nor is it hostage to the claim that any racial discriminatory outcome is 
based on vestiges of past racism (in fact, people continue to harbor these implicit 
attitudes and stereotypes). The fact that we tend to implicitly value White lives 
over Black lives demonstrates a potential explanation for the results found in the 
Baldus studies, and it powerfully illustrates that the seeds for discriminatory 
decision-making in the capital context are not dead and gone; but instead, they 
live, literally, within us.  
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 Id. at 204-05. 
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 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (statement 
regarding the denial of certiorari). 




This Article presented the results of an experimental study of 445 jury eligible 
citizens located in six of the most active death penalty states in the country. 
Cognizant of persistent racial disparities in the administration of the modern death 
penalty, we sought to examine whether implicit racial bias helps to shed light on 
where and how race influences death penalty outcomes. Our findings—among 
them: jury eligible citizens implicitly associate Whites with “worth” and Blacks 
with “worthless,” death-qualified jurors hold stronger implicit and self reported 
biases than do jury eligible citizens generally, the exclusion of non-White jurors 
accounts for the differing level of implicit racial bias between death-qualified and 
non-death qualified jurors, implicit racial bias predicts race of the defendant 
effects and explicit racial bias predicts race of the victim effects—strongly 
suggest that implicit racial bias does have an impact on the administration of the 
death penalty in America. Specifically, we conclude that implicit bias complicates 
the Supreme Court’s reliance on retribution as the legitimizing punishment 
rationale for the death penalty, complements and diversifies the proof that the 
post-Gregg procedural regulation of capital punishment has not been successful at 
eliminating racial arbitrariness, and hints that procedural regulations intended to 
promote impartiality—for example, death-qualification—might, in fact, 
exacerbate the influence of race on death penalty outcomes.  
We hope that this Article is seen as a beginning—proof that research into the 
locations and procedures that drive racial disparities are worth exploring through 
the lens of implicit social cognition. Future researchers might want to explore 
directly the relationship between race and retribution by testing, for example, 
whether implicit racial bias scores predict support for capital punishment as 
expressed through policy statements (or even newspaper stories) that present 
retributive (compared to, say, deterrence) rationales for capital punishment. 
Scholars might also test whether implicit racial bias plays a role in pre-trial 
sorting of capital cases. For example, do prosecutors perceive cases to be more 
serious when they involve White victims, and, if so, do value of life implicit bias 
scores predict these seriousness evaluations?  
Whether the audience consists of state legislators examining whether capital 
punishment remains a wise policy choice, the Supreme Court deciding if the death 
penalty can be sustained on retributive grounds or if procedural regulations have 
eradicated intolerable racial arbitrariness, or even individual prosecutors or capital 
jurors deciding whether to impose the death penalty in a particular case, more 
research is needed to isolate when, where and how race influences the 
administration of capital punishment. Tools such as the methods developed in the 
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field of implicit social cognition provide the mechanisms necessary to glean the 
answers that decision-makers need in a way that scholars simply could not 
imagine at the time that Furman and Gregg were decided. We hope that this 
Article—and the study that anchors it—is the first of many studies to engage 
these questions through the implicit social cognition lens.   
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  B Wald Exp(B) 
Race of Victim (RV) 0.15 0.08 1.16 
Race of Defendant 
(RD) 
0.20 0.16 1.22 
Value of Life IAT 
(VIAT) 
0.91 1.97 2.48 
Stereotype IAT 
(SIAT) 
-0.68 1.31 0.51 
MRS 0.20 0.50 1.22 
RV*RD -0.54 0.91 0.58 
RV*VIAT -0.77 0.88 0.46 
RD*VIAT -1.77 4.69 0.17* 
RV*SIAT 0.19 0.06 1.21 
RD*SIAT 0.87 1.35 2.38 
RV*MRS 0.75 3.95 2.12* 
RD*MRS 0.17 0.20 1.18 
Gender -0.44 2.65 0.64 
White Participant -0.18 0.18 0.83 
*p<.05 
Table 3.   
Regression Results 
  






Attorney: And what was your relation to Edward Walsh [Jamal Washington]? 
Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]: He was my husband. 
Attorney:  How long had Edward [Jamal] and you been married prior to his 
death? 
Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]: Over 25 years. 
Attorney: And we've heard some testimony that Edward [Jamal] worked a lot. 
Would you ever go see him?  
Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]: Yeah. I'd go see him. I was working days at the 
time, you know, a regular 8 to 5 job. So in the evening I'd usually go pick up 
supper somewhere and take it and go meet him and we'd sit and have supper. 
Attorney: And what types of things did you and Edward [Jamal] like to do 
together? 
Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]: Just about everything.  
We had both decided that we were going to retire early and spend a lot of time 
together we would take trips, you know, short weekend trips, sneak off for a day 
somewhere.  Go down to the city, walk through the center of town. 
Attorney: Despite your busy schedules, did you make time for each other? 
Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]: Yes, sir, we tried to. Tried to make the time we 
could. 
Attorney: Did you and Edward [Jamal] have children? 
Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]: Yes, sir.  We have one boy and one girl, both 
grown now. 
Attorney: Had Edward just passed some tests that was of importance to you and 
to him, as well? 
Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]: Edward [Jamal] just found out that, I'm sorry, 
[Witness sobbing.  Requests tissues from bailiff] Edward had just found out that 
he had passed the test for manager, and he would have probably made manager. 
So when he made assistant manager, which was his job at the time he was killed, 
he had passed me up because when I left I was a department manager.  So when 
he made assistant manager, his first joke was now you've got to take orders from 
me. But it was, it was, it was a milestone we were both proud of. 
Attorney: Where do you stand today? 
Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]: Obviously life is not the same. It has 
completely fallen apart, for all the dreams, you know. I was probably married 
longer than possibly some of y 'all in here were alive at the time. And, you know, 
it's your friend, it's your lover, it's your confidant and your husband, and that more 
than disappeared one morning, you never get that back. You never get that back. 
Attorney: Thank you very much, Mrs. Walsh [Mrs. Washington]. 

























Photo 4 (Black Victim) 
 
